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ABSTRACT  
   
This dissertation studies the role of organizational politics and power and 
their role in the success of public service Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). By 
doing so, it addresses two areas of research in network governance and 
organizational theory. On one hand it explores the role of public private 
partnerships in the emerging network governance paradigm of public 
administration. On the other hand it studies the widely discussed but considerably 
under-researched role of organizational power in network governance. The 
literature review establishes public service PPPs as a sub type of governance 
networks, and provides an initial framework to study the nature and dynamics of 
power in these PPPs. The research is descriptive in nature and uses inductive 
reasoning in the tradition of Kathleen Eisenhardt. Case studies in rural areas of 
Punjab, Pakistan are conducted on two very similar PPPs. A replication logic is 
used to understand how power contributed to the success of one of those projects 
and lack of success in the other. Based on analysis of the findings, the dissertation 
concludes that public service PPPs succeed when the goals of the PPP are aligned 
with the goals of the most powerful collaborators. This is because regardless of its 
structure, a public service PPP pursues the goals targeted by the sum total of the 
power of its politically active collaborators. The dissertation also provides insight 
into the complexity of the concept of success in public service PPPs and the donor 
control on the operation and outcomes of public service PPPs. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Background 
 
The concept of public private partnership (PPP) is not new to the practice of 
public administration. For the past few decades, governments have been 
encouraging local and international businesses to invest in public service projects 
especially the ones requiring heavy infrastructural investment. These projects 
have included motor ways, urban mass transit, parks and recreation facilities and 
so on (Hodge & Greve, 2007; Andersen, 2004). The problem oriented and project 
based nature of public private partnerships, makes for a simple and efficient 
partnership between government and private organizations (Bult-Spiering & 
Dewulf, 2007). It provides an opportunity for sharing of financial risks across 
sectors (Allen, 2001), and ensures that each function in the delivery of the public 
service is being handled by the party most experienced and well trained to 
conduct it. 
Success of the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model has therefore made it 
lucrative for other public service projects as well. A number of international 
development projects especially those carried out by the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), and other international donor organizations such as 
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United States Agency for International Development (USAID) now rely on the 
PPP model (ADB, 2008; World Bank, 2009; USAID, 2011). Money received 
from the international donor is not spent directly by the government agency in this 
model, but is disbursed to a network of government and non government 
organizations that work together to serve a public purpose. This ensures 
transparency and provides a way around corruption and inefficiency that troubles 
a number of governments in developing countries. 
 
PPP in Public Administration Literature 
 
As observed by Forrer et al (2010), public private partnerships have been in 
action, delivering public services, at least since the Roman Empire. However, in 
the past few decades they have found an unprecedented increase in significance 
and magnitude. This significance has been noted by scholars and practitioners 
alike in international development (Tennyson, 2003), urban development and 
infrastructure (Hodge & Greve, 2007) and with some differences in terminology, 
the civil society literature (Alexander & Nank, 2009; Brudney & Mendel, 2012; 
Salamon, 1995). By the very nature of their existence and operation, PPPs have 
become relevant to the field of Public Administration that has recently opened 
itself to concepts beyond the structure and functions of government organizations. 
PPPs are some of the easily observable empirical applications of the theoretical 
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concepts we have been reading about in the Network Governance literature, as in 
they are networks of organizations from different sectors that are usually 
governed in an indirect, imperfect fashion by government organizations and in 
many cases pursue critical public purposes, from mass transit to elementary 
education and from basic health to national security.  
While Public Private Partnerships have become an integral part of the delivery of 
public service in the past couple of decades, they have not seen a commensurate 
representation in the public administration literature. A keyword search for 
"Public Private Partnership" returned only 30-odd articles in Public 
Administration Review and a mere 9 articles in Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory in the past 10 years. Most of those articles dealt with 
matters of urban infrastructure and privatization. Another keyword search of 
"Public Private Partnership" AND "Network Governance" returned only 4 articles 
each from these two most reputed Public Administration journals for the past 10 
years.  Finally, the keywords "Network Governance" returned 40-odd articles in 
both these journals for the past 10 years. This means that for every 10 articles 
having to do anything with network governance, published in the two top public 
administration journals, only 1 talked about PPPs despite their theoretical and 
empirical relevance to the concept of network governance. New publications in 
public administration are however picking up on their significance and the Public 
Performance and Management Review (PPMR) published a special edition 
dedicated entirely to PPPs in June 2012.  
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PPP and Power 
With the paradigm shift in public administration towards governance networks, 
the literature has addressed a number of "big questions" (Agranoff & McGuire, 
2001). One of these big questions is the role of power in network governance. A 
lot of theoretical and empirical pieces in network governance attempt to address 
the role of power (Brass et al, 2004). Power has been studied in different 
organizational settings and different models of public service delivery. Similarly, 
factors affecting power and the possible impacts of power have been the topics of 
several descriptive studies (Provan & Milward, 1991). However, most if not all of 
these studies address the question of power in an indirect way. They do not dig 
deeper into what exactly is the role that power plays in the outcomes of an 
organizational network. The question of power in network governance will 
therefore be a source of considerable curiosity in any study of PPPs in public 
service. Because if a public service PPP is a form of network governance, and it is 
a model being rapidly adopted in the practice of public administration, we are 
practicing something in the absence of critical information about it. This brings 
me to my research question.  
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Research Question 
 
How does organizational power affect the success of a public service 
public private partnership?  
 
The theoretical grounding of this question will be revisited after the literature 
review in Chapter 4. However the importance of this question comes from the fact 
that it addresses two sources of intellectual curiosity at the same time. On one 
hand it explores the idea of success in Public Private Partnerships, and on the 
other hand it explores the question of the role of power in network governance.  
 
Research Agenda 
The research consists of two case studies. The case studies were conducted in the 
rural areas of the Punjab province in Pakistan. Punjab is the largest province in 
the country and houses about a half of the country’s population. The majority of 
the provinces population lives in rural areas and is dependent on agriculture for 
their sustenance. A number of local and national organizations in Punjab have 
been engaging in different individual and PPP based projects to address the 
overwhelming health issues encountered by rural communities. Case studies for 
this project dealt with two of these PPP projects involving the same collaborators. 
Despite the similarity among partners and structure, one of the projects proved to 
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be highly successful while the other faced crippling challenges. The similarity of 
the PPPs and the difference in the outcomes presented a unique opportunity for 
applying a replication logic to study the factors that contributed to the high 
achievement of one project and the low achievement of the other. 
 The evidence was collected and studied using guidelines by Yin (2009) and was 
analyzed for inductive reasoning in the tradition of Eisenhardt (1989). The key 
contributions of this study are in the form of testable theoretical propositions that 
respond to the research question while adding to existing theory on organizational 
power and network governance.  
 
Dissertation Outline 
The rest of this dissertation is divided into to five chapters. Chapters 2 presents 
the literature review on Public Private Partnerships and their significance in 
public administration in general and network governance in particular. Chapter 3 
deals with the role of power in network environments, and presents a theoretical 
framework that can shed some light on the concept of power and politics in public 
service PPPs. Chapter 4 deals with the research methodology and details the data 
collection and analysis approaches. Chapter 5 presents the findings of the study 
along some basic analysis. Chapter 6 concludes the study by presenting the 
theoretical propositions emerging from inductive reasoning, outlining avenues for 
future research and discussing the merits of the study and its limitations. 
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Chapter 2 
PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
Chapter 2: Public Private Partnerships in Public Administration 
 
Network Governance and Public Administration 
Throughout its self conscious history, the field of Public Administration has found 
several theoretical, philosophical and implementation perspectives at its 
mainstream. The first and foremost of such perspectives was brought into the 
public administration literature by the very introduction of the field to American 
academics by authors such as Wilson (1887) and Goodnow (1900). This view saw 
government as a dichotomy of politics and administration, where the work of the 
government was to express and execute the will of the public. This will was 
expressed by politically elected representatives of the public and was documented 
as acts of legislative bodies. The execution of this will was then the responsibility 
of technical and managerial experts retained by government agencies, also known 
as public administrators. It was perhaps because of this dichotomy that some 
significant contributions to the field of public administration that came out 
towards the mid twentieth century were either specialized in public policy or in 
the executive side of public administration. Public policy theorists explored the 
dynamics of what Goodnow (1900) called "the expression of the will of public" 
by studying the phenomena of collective action (Olson, 1965), political pluralism 
(Dahl, 1961), governmental agenda setting(Kingdon, 1984; Arnold,1990; 
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Baumgartner & Jones, 1993) and so on. Administrative theorists on the other hand 
discussed the empowerment and accountability of public administrators, most 
notably in the Friedrich - Finer debates (Friedrich, 1940; Finer, 1941) as well as 
the efficiency and effectiveness of public management (Simon, 1947). 
A clear paradigm shift in the field of public administration was introduced by 
Waldo (1953) . The key feature of Waldo's paradigm was an appreciation of the 
responsibility public administrators held towards the public they served, as 
opposed to the political representatives. This re-imagination opened a whole new 
chapter in the theoretical development of the field. The resulting academic 
discussions explored the role of public administrators in the public policy making 
process beyond legislative bodies and interest groups (Lindblom, 1959; Lipsky, 
1980) and their legitimacy in doing so (McSwite, 1997). The responsibility of 
public administrators to the public was also envisioned as the responsibility of a 
vendor to a customer in a market, and manifested in the New Public Management 
(NPM) movement (Lynn, 1996). NPM discussions resulted in the inclusion of 
entrepreneurial variables such as economic efficiency, competition and customer 
service into the study of public administration. 
NPM dominated the practice of public administration and stayed a leading topic 
in theoretical literature for almost two decades. However the high expectations 
from this new approach did not materialize in the long run. For one, adopting 
NPM strategies resulted in an increased size of the government rather than the 
perceived decrease (Salamon, 1995; Sorensen & Torfing, 2007a) and its public 
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service benefits were highly criticized in later works, notably Denhardt & 
Denhardt (2002) who proposed the New Public Service approach as a more 
citizen focused alternative to the market focused approaches of new public 
management. Despite these failures, NPM had a significant impact on the 
research imagination of the academics in the field. The market was the 
centerpiece of NPM and the market was open to all organizations, public and 
private. Even though the inclusion of organizations outside the government in the 
NPM vision was for the sole purposes of managerial benchmarking and making 
outsourcing decisions, this openness to the environment, for the first time, 
encouraged public administration theorists looked for public service outside the 
confines of government organizations.
    10 
 
P
o
litics v
ersu
s 
A
d
m
in
istratio
n
  
N
ew
  P
u
b
lic 
M
an
ag
em
en
t 
G
o
v
ern
an
ce 
P
ersp
ectiv
e 
- E
lected
 O
fficials 
- P
u
b
lic M
an
ag
ers 
- P
u
b
lic E
n
trep
ren
eu
rs 
- P
eo
p
le (C
u
sto
m
ers)- P
riv
ate C
o
n
tracto
rs 
A
ll stak
eh
o
ld
ers relev
an
t to
 a p
u
b
lic p
u
rp
o
se, in
clu
d
in
g
 p
u
b
lic, 
p
riv
ate an
d
 n
o
n
p
ro
fit ag
en
cies, in
d
iv
id
u
al sch
o
lars, p
o
litician
s 
an
d
 activ
ists, g
en
eral p
u
b
lic 
K
ey
 A
cto
rs 
    11 
T
ech
n
o
crats acco
u
n
tab
le to
 
m
em
b
ers o
f elected
 b
o
d
ies 
- E
co
n
o
m
ic In
d
icato
rs 
- R
eg
u
lato
ry
 A
g
en
cies 
- M
ark
et C
o
m
p
etitio
n
  
- S
teerin
g
 A
g
en
cies 
- P
u
b
lic S
erv
ice N
etw
o
rk
 
M
em
b
ers (M
u
tu
al 
A
cco
u
n
tab
ility
) 
A
cco
u
n
ta
b
ility
 M
ech
a
n
ism
s 
F
o
rm
al/B
u
reau
cratic 
lead
ersh
ip
 
B
ased
 o
n
 co
n
tem
p
o
rary
 
b
u
sin
ess lead
ersh
ip
 
- N
etw
o
rk
 M
an
ag
em
en
t 
C
o
m
p
eten
cies 
- S
elf R
eg
u
latio
n
 
L
ea
d
ersh
ip
 S
ty
le 
    12 
- P
o
licy
 im
p
lem
en
tatio
n
 
- E
co
n
o
m
ic E
fficien
cy
 
- S
u
rv
iv
al in
 M
ark
et 
- E
co
n
o
m
ic E
fficien
cy
 
- C
u
sto
m
er S
erv
ice 
- P
ro
b
lem
-o
rien
ted
 
- E
ach
 acto
r h
as fu
ll o
r p
artial stak
e in
 n
etw
o
rk
 g
o
als; In
d
iv
id
u
al 
o
rg
an
izatio
n
al g
o
als m
ay
 b
e p
u
rsu
ed
 th
ro
u
g
h
 in
ter 
-o
rg
an
izatio
n
al relatio
n
sh
ip
s 
O
rg
a
n
iza
tio
n
a
l G
o
a
ls 
Table 1: Key Theoretical Perspectives in Public Administration 
 
The late 1990s and early 2000s saw the latest perspective in the field of public 
administration in the concept of Governance. The new theoretical lens was an 
acknowledgement of the fact by public administration theorists that public service 
is not being delivered solely by the hands of government employees. Through 
contracted services, community development initiatives, information and 
communication technologies and mass communication channels, a number of 
business, social, academic and other organizations were involved in serving one 
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or the other public purposes. Even the public services apparently rendered by a 
government agency depended heavily on the active involvement of multiple 
organizations within and outside the government. Table 1 summarizes the three 
research imaginations discussed in this section along with their key 
characteristics.  
Earlier theories in this perspective focused on the "hollowing" out of the state by 
replacing government bureaucracies with multisectoral networks. That is, the 
government agencies, instead of being large entities providing public service on 
their own, should reduce their size and assume a coordinating role while the 
services are being provided by organizations from private and voluntary sectors 
networked through contractual arrangements (Rhodes, 1994; Milward & Provan, 
2000; Milward & Provan, 2003; Alexander & Nank, 2009). Authors such as 
Sorensen & Torfing (2007a), however, do not consider network governance as 
hollowing of the state. In their opinion, the advent of a network does not require 
the government agencies to reduce in size. Instead, it warrants development of an 
alternative set of competencies by government administrators so they can provide 
regulation and oversight to the networks at the same time allowing the networks 
to regulate themselves from within.  This abstract level steering is termed as 
"meta-governance" (Sorensen & Torfing, 2005; Sorensen, 2006; Sorensen & 
Torfing, 2007a; Sorensen & Torfing, 2007b). Sorensen & Torfing (2007a) have 
identified various approaches by which networks can be meta-governed and have 
classified them into four categories, namely Interdependency, Governability, 
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Governmentality and Integration theories, based on the researcher's focus on 
rational behavior versus cultural conformance and conflict versus coordination 
among network actors.  
Governability theory suggest that the state can exercise meta-governance without 
directly intervening in the network processes, i.e. using a "hands-off" approach. 
Instead of directly altering the network, the state can define institutional norms of 
communication and interaction and can even establish reward and punishment 
mechanisms throughout the network's environment. Defining the rules of the 
game this way will ensure that even though network actors are self governing, the 
regulation of the network from within is not hindered by deadlocks caused due to 
internal conflict. 
Integration theory, like Governability theory is also prescriptive in nature, and 
suggests "hands-off" strategies for efficient meta-governance such as meta-
governance of the network actors' identities and capacities. Meta-governance of 
the actors' identities makes them better aware of their position in the network, the 
role they are performing the achievement of network goals and the significance of 
communicating and understanding other actors in the network. Meta-governance 
of the actors' capacities can be done by enhancing their capacity to understand and 
act upon the democratic political ideals with which the network intends to serve 
the society. Understanding their position in the society and developing and 
enhancing their political competencies and making them aware of the democratic 
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values are, in this theory, best ways to regulate self regulating networks to achieve 
positive outcomes.  
Governmentality theory is another hands-off approach to meta-governance though 
it is of a descriptive nature, hence it only reflects on the observed phenomena 
rather than suggesting future strategies. It notes the significance of the role of 
state in network governance. The state is responsible for facilitating network 
formation and operation. At the same time however it is also responsible for 
evaluating, rewarding or sanctioning network actors. So the government allows 
the network actors to self regulate but at the same time defines the limitations to 
that self regulation. 
Interdependency theory has a descriptive perspective on meta-governance. 
According to this theory, allowing the networks to self regulate without any 
external steering can result in network failure as there can be too many conflicts 
among various actors. That is why the state usually adopts a "hands on" approach 
exercising direct influence on the network processes. This can be done through 
attempting to improve capacity of network actors to facilitate self regulation using 
process management strategies. Another option is to take the more invasive route 
of network participation where state agencies join the network so they can 
facilitate regulation from inside the network. 
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Public Service Networks: Theory and Practice 
  
It is interesting to note that prior to the paradigm shift towards the idea of 
governance and the resulting "hollowing" of the state in mainstream research 
imagination, the literature on public administration was generally focused on the 
role of actors lying within some for of government organization. This has also 
been shown empirically by Bingham & Bowen (1994) who outlined the most 
recurring theoretical topics in publications in Public Administration Review and 
none of the topics dealt directly with the role of non governmental actors in public 
administration. On the other hand, as evidenced by Salamon (1995), the 
responsibility of delivering public service in the United States was being 
increasingly shared by civil sector organizations throughout the second half of the 
twentieth century and the presence of voluntary organizations providing services 
in healthcare, education, environmental conservation and several other areas was 
acknowledged in local governmental policies. A significant phenomenon in the 
practice of public administration that emerged in Europe around the last quarter of 
the twentieth century and caught up quickly to the American urban planners was 
of the Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2007; Hodge & 
Greve, 2007). This approach allows for private businesses to develop 
infrastructure, run services and collect revenues on behalf of the government for a 
specified amount of time. However unlike privatization, the infrastructure 
developed in PFI stays under government ownership with the private party acting 
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as a lessee. The provision of public service provided by a PFI brings operational 
efficiency to public service and the government ownership makes room for the 
public voice to enter the decision making processes not only through consumer 
choice but also from the democratic political channels. 
Public Private Partnerships (PPP) is a term that has found acceptance in the 
practitioner community in the past couple of decades as a catch-all term for these 
collaborative ventures where the government mandates an organization or a group 
of organizations belonging to private sectors to provide certain public services 
(Allen, 2001; Koppenjan & Enserik, 2009; Wang, 2009; Forrer et al., 2010). The 
mandate usually involves the operation and development of government owned 
assets by these non government collaborators. PPPs are an essential part of the 
developmental aid strategies of organizations such as World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank and USAID etc, in which case the partnerships also includes 
nonprofit organizations (World Bank, 2007; ADB, 2008; USAID, 2011). In the 
developed world, these partnerships are used as a means of lowering 
government's investment risks in grand public projects such as urban mass transit 
schemes, healthcare infrastructure and even information and communication 
systems(DFID, 2007). 
Despite the significance of PPPs in the practice of public administration, a very 
small amount of theoretical and empirical work appears in the mainstream public 
administration literature that specifically refers to PPPs. Most of the academic 
work on PPPs has been produced in the fields of community development and 
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urban planning and management with occasional entries from public 
administration scholars such as Klijn & Teisman (2003) and Koppenjan & 
Enserik (2009). This is rather an awkward observation since it is evident from the 
above discussion that PPPs are significant practical representations of the 
"hollowing" of the state that is the basic premise of the governance paradigm, 
especially in the area of network governance. There is, therefore ample 
opportunity to link the practical aspects of PPPs to the existing theory on network 
governance. Building on this opportunity, the rest of this chapter attempts to place 
PPPs in the realm of network governance by establishing them as an academically 
sub type of public service networks. 
 
Public Private Partnerships vs Public Sector - Private Sector Partnerships 
 
As mentioned in the above section, PPPs have historically been seen as 
partnerships between public and private sector organizations. This concept has 
resonated in a large number of works produced in academic as well as practitioner 
generated literature on PPPs (Patrinos & Sosale, 2007; Koppenjan & Enserik, 
2009; Wang, 2009). However recent practitioner literature on PPPs, such as the 
Asian Development Bank's handbook on Public Private Partnerships (ADB,2008) 
and the Partnering Tool Book prepared by the International Business Leader 
Forum (Tennyson, 2003) supports PPPs that have nonprofits as partners. In fact, 
nowadays there exist partnerships that call themselves PPPs even though all 
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parties involved belong either to the public or the nonprofit sectors (Pakistan 
Ministry of Education, 2004). Similarly, some of the leading scholars on 
European PPPs such as Osborne (2001) indicate that the significance of PPP is 
not limited to urban infrastructure development but can also contribute to the 
effectiveness of the civil society. Even in one of the recent academic pieces 
published in Public Administration Review (Forrer et al., 2010), the authors, even 
after defining PPPs as partnerships between public and private sectors (p476), 
switch frequently between public sector and nonprofit sector organizations as PPP 
partners (p478 and p480). These observations, then, present an interesting puzzle, 
i.e. are Public Private Partnerships the same as Partnerships between Public-sector 
and Private-sector organizations? Given the fact that PPPs and their role in 
Network Governance and Public Administration in general is a focus of this 
chapter, it is important to address this question as early as possible.   
Let us begin with the way PPP is defined in the urban development literature, 
which can be treated as the contemporary "home" of the concept in terms of the 
current scholarship. According to Bult-Spiering & Dewulf (2007) Some of the 
early academic definitions of PPPs can be seen in the works of Peters (1997) and 
Anderson (2004) who treat PPPs as special types of purpose built organizational 
partnerships developed around public service projects and can involve two or 
more organizations, one of which is must be a government agency. Note that 
these definitions do not specify the sector the other organizations belong to. 
Which means a partnership between a government and a nonprofit organization 
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can be called PPP without conflicting with this definition. This idea has also been 
confirmed by Wang (2009) who observes the general acceptance of a number of 
definitions of PPPs ranging from broad spectrum multi sector partnerships to the 
strictest interpretations of Public Finance Initiatives.  
Urban planning and public administration are not alone in blurring the lines 
between private sector and non profit sector organizations when the term "private" 
represents being a non state actor. This same observation can be made in the 
works on government-civil society relationships as well. Salamon (1995) is 
notable for using the term "private" to describe private corporations and nonprofit 
organizations alike, factoring them into his "third party government" model that in 
its essence is very similar to the concept of network governance (Salamon, 1995). 
Another interesting observation made in this stream of literature is the shared 
financial responsibility between government and nonprofit institutions. 
Given the above analysis, this chapter is now ready to take its own position on the 
definition of PPPs. We conclude that a Public-Private Partnership, at least for the 
sake of this chapter, is a concept that represents not only a partnership between 
public and private sector organizations, but also partnerships between government 
agencies and private parties, both for profit and nonprofit, that collaborate to 
deliver government sanctioned public services. A public service network with any 
combination of public, nonprofit or private organizations can be called a PPP as 
long as it satisfies the defining characteristics laid out by Bult-Spiering & Dewulf 
(2007). That is, at least one of the partners is a government agency, the 
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partnership is project based, and that the interorganizational relationships are 
governed by clear contractual agreements outlining the responsibilities and 
expectations of partner organizations regarding the shared infrastructural 
investment and shared responsibility for delivering the intended public service. 
 
Public Private Partnerships and Network Governance 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to 
a discussion on the treatment of PPPs in the network governance literature. A 
pertinent starting point in this attempt will be to place PPPs in the network 
governance literature by establishing a working definition of PPP in the 
literature's vernacular. This can be done by developing a classification of public 
service networks based on some of the major studies in network governance, 
followed by an analysis of the existing definitions of PPPs to see how they fit into 
that classification. Establishing PPPs as a category of public service networks will 
help identify relevant topics in the network governance literature that address 
matters specific to such partnerships and will also help determine what the 
existing body of literature knows about PPPs and what needs to be learned 
through future research and academic work in other disciplines. Since the focus of 
this chapter is on the treatment of PPPs in the theory as well as the practice of 
network governance, it will make sense to place PPPs not only in the conceptual 
dimensions of network governance but also in the managerial dimensions of the 
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field. This can be done by identifying key elements of public management 
relevant to network governance and analyzing their applications on PPPs. 
It should be worth mentioning at this point that while in theory, any combination 
of public, private, community, media and other organizations and individuals can 
constitute a public service network, this chapter narrows down the scope of 
"public service networks" to only those organizational networks that are formed 
through policy decisions or a "charter" on the part of a governing organization, 
such as a governmental agency or a legislative body. Similarly while a number of 
studies cited in this chapter define "sectors" differently, this chapter will limit 
itself to a tri-sector model with all organizations including businesses, NGOs, 
universities, media enterprises, legislative bodies, local governments and so on, 
identified as belonging to either the public, private or nonprofit sectors. .  
 
Classification of Public Service Networks 
 
The need for the classification of organizational networks goes beyond the 
attempt the purpose of finding a place for PPPs as public service networks. This 
need has been long felt in the fields of organization theory and network 
governance alike. Provan et al (2007) were among the first to critique attempts to 
establish catch-all frameworks that could be used to study organizational 
networks of all kinds. Based on a comprehensive study of recent empirical work 
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on organizational networks, they identified the common variables studied in the 
bulk of empirical work on organizational networks and classified the variables 
according to levels of analysis and other analytical dimensions. Herranz (2008) 
has also highlighted the problems associated with attempting to link the theory of 
network management with its practice without an appropriate classification of 
public service networks. His research classified public service networks according 
to the managerial models being used in the steering of network operations and 
outcomes. This classification linked the empirical observations of network 
management to familiar organizational management models. The classification 
proposed in this chapter varies from the works of Provan et al (2007) and Herranz 
(2008) in the sense that instead of traversing the levels of analysis, it stays at the 
network level of analysis and attempts to classify public service networks on 
structural and outcome-based dimensions. . 
I begin outlining my classification framework by imagining the components of a 
public service network based on a working definition of network governance. The 
definition chosen for this purpose is Rhodes's (1996) conceptualization of 
network governance that is also the basis of Sorensen & Torfing's (2005) widely 
accepted definition of democratic network governance. 
Rhodes (1996) begins his view of network governance as service provided to the 
public by "permutations of the government, private and voluntary sectors" (p. 
658). These permutations, that I shall refers to Public Service Networks for the 
rest of this chapter are elaborated by Rhodes as being "self governing, inter-
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organizational networks" that are individually autonomous but depend on each 
other and engage in continuous mutual interactions based on resource exchange 
and shared purposes. Government in such networks does not enjoy formal 
authority, but can "indirectly and imperfectly steer networks" (p. 660).   
While this definition provides a number of characteristics of public service 
network, three appear to be directly relevant for the purpose of classification. 
These are the service provided by the network, the organizational makeup of the 
network, i.e. the "permutation" of public, private and voluntary organizations 
providing the service and finally, the nature of interactions between these 
organizations. These categories can be broadened using terminology from 
Sorensen & Torfing's (2005, p. 197) definition of democratic public service 
networks. The term "actor grouping" can therefore be used instead of 
"organizations" as a catchall for organizations as well as the sectors that 
organizations belong to. Agranoff (2007) in his research has used the purpose of a 
public service network as a significant classifier. The term "Services" in the 
aforementioned definition can therefore be replaced with "public purpose" to 
establish another dimension of network governance classification. Finally, since 
the interactions within the network are at least imperfectly steered by a 
government agency despite self regulation, constant negotiations, bargaining and 
power struggles (Rhodes, 1996; Sorensen & Torfing, 2005), the mechanism of 
this governance can provide us with the third dimension for the classification of 
network. This chapter relies on the modes of governance identified by Provan & 
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Kenis (2008) that has been referenced by several notable works in network 
governance in Public Administration as well as management in general, such as 
Kenis et al (2009) and Raab & Kenis (2009). 
While a working definition of public service networks gives us a basis for the 
classification of these networks, empirical examples are required to assign 
meaning to such classification. The categories developed in the following analysis 
are applied primarily to a set of public service networks listed in Agranoff (2007). 
The study has been selected to facilititate the analysis as it analyzes fourteen 
different networks with highly diverse sectoral affiliations, public purposes and 
control mechanisms and is thus rich in examples of various kinds of networks. 
Additional examples come from Harranz (2007), Salamon (1995) and Bult-
Spiering & Dewulf (2007) and have been selected based on their relevance to the 
nature of categories in which they are used. 
 
Classification by Actor Grouping 
The understanding developed in this chapter for network governance pays an 
inherent attention to the sectors the actors within a network represent. Studies on 
management and strategy making in public service networks often reciprocate this 
emphasis and take careful note of the sectoral representation of network actors 
(Herranz, 2007). This makes a case for the importance of distinguishing public 
service networks from one another based on the types of actors that come together 
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to serve the public purpose. At the most abstract level, this category can group 
actors by their affiliation to the major "sectors" of the governance world, such as 
public, private and voluntary, media or the "fourth element" as well as individual 
stakeholders. The actor groupings within a network can be helpful in providing 
the researcher an ability to use theoretical models relevant to the groups involved 
when studying empirical phenomena. The following presents an abstract 
classification of public service networks through actor groupings.  
 
Single Sector Networks 
These networks pursue public purposes through interactions between individuals 
and organizations representing a specific sector of the governance world that can 
operate independent of each other and are not required to report to each other, nor 
to any common formal authority. A good example of such networks is the Des 
Moines Area Metropolitan Planning Organization, a network of city, county, state 
and federal governments and regional and metropolitan authorities in the Des 
Moines Metropolitan area in Iowa, formed for transportation planning in the 
metropolitan area (Agranoff, 2007). 
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Dual Sector Networks 
These public service networks are common in several policy areas. The most 
common partnerships exist in urban planning and development where government 
organizations contract a private party to construct or renovate public service 
facilities with or without shared investment from the government. Such facilities 
are operated by the private contractor for a pre determined period of time and the 
government acts both as the customer and the regulator of the facility and its 
services (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2007). Similarly, the government agencies can 
partner with non profit organizations to enhance the delivery of public services by 
using human resource and business models developed by the non profit. Indiana 
Rural Development Council is an example of such networks that brings together 
government and nonprofit organizations on a "forum to address rural issues, 
establish partnerships and enable partners to take action" in the rural areas of 
Indiana (Agranoff, 2007). 
 
Multi Sector Networks 
More often than not, multi sector networks are formed around the solution of 
wicked problems, that cannot be tackled with foreseeable contractual or policy 
arrangements. A number of problem solving networks fall under this category. 
Examples include The Work Place, a network of several government agencies, 
nonprofits and private sector organizations set up to facilitate skill development 
and employment opportunities in the Boston area (Harranz, 2007). Iowa 
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Geographic Information Council, a network of federal, state, regional, county and 
city governments as well as private and nonprofit organizations and universities, 
working as a "clearing house for coordinated systems and data sharing" is also a 
good example of multi sector public service networks.  
 
Classification by Public Purpose. 
One of the defining characteristics of public service networks is the fact that they 
are set up to serve a certain public purpose (Rhodes, 1997; Sorensen & Torfing, 
2005) which usually translates into countering certain public "problems" 
(Harranz, 2007). Agranoff (2007) used the nature of these public purposes or 
problems to assign public service networks into four categories, namely Action, 
Development, Informational and Outreach networks. This classification can help 
a student of network governance to use the service specific literature in order to 
understand the dynamics of a network in situations where empirical observations 
are hard to explain using generic network governance theoretical models. For 
example, the performance of a development network might be simpler to 
understand when compared to the performance of other development and capacity 
building related initiatives. The following explores Agranoff's (2007) categories 
to arrive at a classification of public service networks based on their public 
purpose.  
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Action Networks 
Action networks are the kind of organizational partnerships where all 
collaborators work jointly on an area of mutual interest. The working 
relationships are established through formal organizational arrangements 
(Agranoff, 2007). These networks are usually formed to tackle problems with 
well researched solutions. These networks bring together competencies from 
different governance sectors to identify social problems or potential opportunities 
and then set specific targets for the collaboration to achieve in a project-based 
fashion. Examples of these networks include The Work Place, an organizational 
network set up to facilitate employment opportunities in the Boston area (Harranz, 
2007) and Iowa Communications Network, a collaboration between federal, state 
and local government agencies to provide fiber optic network connectivity 
throughout the state of Iowa (Agranoff, 2007). 
 
Developmental  Networks 
Development networks bring together partners that can benefit from an exchange 
of information and technical expertise and educate and provide services to each in 
order to enhance the capacity of partner organizations to implement solutions in 
their respective areas of operation (Agranoff, 2007). These networks are different 
from action networks because instead of all members of the network jointly 
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tackling social problems, some members of the developmental network enhance 
the ability of other members to deal with those problems. These networks may 
also bring academic experts on a matter of policy importance to the people 
responsible for implementation in those policy areas. A good example of such 
networks will be the Partnership for Rural Nebraska, a collaboration of federal, 
state and regional level government agencies that benefit from the research 
conducted at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln in order to provide "resources 
and expertise to enhance rural development opportunities" in the state of 
Nebraska (Agranoff, 2007). 
 
Outreach Networks 
These networks tend to implement solutions to critical problems by conducting 
information, expertise, policy and resource exchanges between members on a 
large scale. The resulting action is taken by a multitude of organizations at 
different levels (Agranoff, 2007). Though similar in some aspects to 
developmental networks, these networks differ in the fact that instead of training 
an organization or a group of organizations to implement time tested solutions to 
public problems, these encourage action taken by organizations on an individual 
level in a broad yet coordinated manner. These networks can be informal, such as 
the Indiana 317 Taskforce, a group of public, private, nonprofit and academic 
organizations set up to research "strategies for developmentally disabled 
community services" as well as formal, such as the federal government facilitated 
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USDA/Rural Development Nebraska partnership that provides "outreach and 
assistance to leverage funds of other programs for public and private 
development" (Agranoff, 2007). 
 
Informational Networks 
Unlike the other three public purpose based forms of public service networks, 
informational networks do not take part in the implementation of solutions. 
Instead, they exchange information, technical knowledge and policy and program 
information within the network. The learning from network partnership may be 
reflected in the action taken by the partner agencies on a voluntary basis 
(Agranoff, 2007). Just like outreach networks, these networks can also be formed 
through formal arrangements or as informal groups. A relevant example of such 
networks is Indiana Economic Development Council, an informational network 
formally incorporated as non profit organization that brings together private, 
academic, non profit and state government agencies that, through this network, 
jointly serve as a "research consultant for state economic development" 
(Agranoff, 2007). 
 
Classification by Mode of Governance. 
While public service networks are formed by independent actors with no direct 
formal chain of authority, there still exist certain control models through which 
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network operations and outcomes can be steered one way or the other. Steering in 
network governance has found widespread interest in the research work on meta 
governance and power in networks (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Agranoff & 
McGuire, 2003; Sorensen, 2006).  
Provan & Kenis (2008) have conducted a seminal research on the control 
mechanisms within organizational networks and have identified three governance 
modes. They discovered that organizational networks can be governed by (A) a 
hub-firm or a lead-organization, (B) a network administrative organization 
(NAO), set up specifically for managing the network, or (C) be self governed by 
the participants. 
 
Participant Governed Networks 
These networks do not have a formal leadership mechanism. According to Provan 
& Kenis (2008) these networks solve problems through a strong goal consensus 
among actors and usually consist of a small number of member organizations 
operating in a high trust environment. Examples of such networks include the 
Small Communities Environmental Infrastructure Group, an informal group of 
state, federal and regional and metropolitan level government agencies as well as 
academic, private and nonprofit organizations, that, according to Agranoff (2007) 
"assists small Ohio governments in their water and wastewater systems".  
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Lead Organization Governed Networks 
These networks, according to Provan & Kenis (2008), are usually formed when a 
central organization requires the services of other organizations to pursue its 
goals, such as in buyer-supplier relationships between a large organization and its 
vendors. For public service networks in this category, the lead organization is 
usually the one primarily responsible for the public purpose of the network. 
Accountability is usually centralized with the lead organization, as opposed to 
being distributed in the case of partner governed networks. The network goals is 
usually more aligned with the lead organization goals than the partner 
organizations. For example, the British agency responsible for federal prisons, 
Her Majesty's Prisons (HMP), is the lead organization in a public service network 
that includes privately constructed and maintained prison facilities. The partner 
organizations are usually construction companies and facility management 
organizations whose goals are indirectly aligned to the network's overall goal of 
prisoner safekeeping (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2007). 
  
Network Administration Organization Governed Networks.  
In a lot of network governance structures where no clear lead organization is 
involved and the network is either too large or too complex to be participant 
governed, a separate organizational entity is created to serve as the lead 
organization. Such a governance model is called the NAO governance model 
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(Provan & Kenis, 2008). An NAO can be seen as an example of a "hollow 
government" or "meta-governance" entity that does not restrict the relationships 
between network members, however it does attempt to keep control on the 
performance of the network towards goal achievement and accountability. Unlike 
the other two models, NAO governed networks are larger in scale and the member 
organizations can have mutually unaligned or even conflicting goals. These 
complications require NAO managers to develop a high level of network 
management skills (Provan & Kenis). An example of NAO governed networks is 
the Iowa Enterprise Network that has been incorporated as a nonprofit 
organization and administers a network of federal government, state government, 
nonprofit and private organizations that "supports home-based and micro-
enterprises" throughout Iowa (Agranoff, 2007). 
 
Public Private Partnerships as Public Service Networks 
 
After breaking down the basic definition of public service networks into various 
categories, this chapter will now attempt to find a placement for PPPs in the 
network governance literature.  This will be done by matching the characteristics 
of PPPs described in relevant streams of academic as well as professional 
literature, on to the public service network categories identified in the previous 
section. Figure1 provides a visual representation of the classification described 
above, along with the position of PPPs with respect to the different aspects of 
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public service networks. The following discussion explores this placement in 
detail: 
 
 
Actor Permutations and PPPs 
More often than not, PPPs have been understood just the way they are titled, i.e. 
dual sector partnerships between public and private sector organizations (Nijkamp 
et al., 2002; Pongsiri, 2002; Klijn & Teisman, 2003). In fact, the historical 
development of the arrangement of PPPs has been rooted in the principles of 
private investment in public infrastructure and risk sharing between public and 
private organizations in large public projects (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2007; 
Hodge & Greve, 2007). In the recent years, however this apparently obvious 
assumption has been blurred by the introduction of the nonprofit sector in a 
number of PPP models, especially in the areas of education and other social 
services (ADB, 2008). The charter school system in the US is often seen as an 
example of PPP where the government agency responsible for education in a 
region can partner with a private and/or a nonprofit organization to provide 
education compliant with the "No Child Left Behind program" (Patrinos et al, 
2009). Some of the mainstream academic definitions such as Peters (1997) and 
Anderson (2004) also leave PPPs open to interpretation as multi-sector, or even 
dual sector partnerships between government and nonprofit organizations, by 
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defining them as partnerships between two or more actors, at least one of whom 
belongs to the government sector. 
Given the above discussion, it can be concluded that there are two distinct 
interpretations of PPPs in terms of actor permutations. The traditional 
interpretation, rooted in the European transport partnerships in the late 20th 
century sees them as dual sector networks, while the opening of the PPP model to 
a broad range of public services in the recent years has resulted in the partnerships 
being identified as multi-sector networks. Figure1 therefore places PPPs in both 
these categories with the respective qualifiers. 
It might also be interesting to note that in a lot of contemporary work on PPPs, the 
term has increasingly begun to represent a concept than a specific type of 
organizational partnerships. PPPs have come to be understood as organizational 
arrangements in which different organizations bring together financial and human 
capital to serve a public purpose on behalf of a government agency. The 
traditional understanding of privately funded public projects is being muddied by 
projects such as the World Bank educational PPP program in Sindh, Pakistan 
(World Bank, 2011) where government funds private parties to run government 
chartered educational institutions and Chief Minister's Initiative on Primary 
Healthcare in Punjab, Pakistan where an entrepreneurial  nonprofit organization 
runs public health facilities funded by the provincial government (CMIPHC, 
2008). 
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Public Purposes and PPPs 
A significant body of academic literature can be used to interpret the concept of 
PPPs as any of the four public purpose networks discussed in the previous section. 
The Public Private Policy Partnerships described by Linder & Rosenau (2000) 
usually act as information, outreach and development networks and focus on 
knowledge generation, capacity building and exchange of information and 
technology between the public and private sectors in key policy areas. However, 
Bult-Spiering & Dewulf (2007) do not consider the policy partnerships as an 
extension of the mainstream PPP concept. According to them, PPPs are 
characterized by their project oriented nature, including focused plans of action, 
formal arrangements between partners and well defined milestones and timelines. 
Their concepts also resonates in the practitioner produced literature where the 
project based nature of PPPs is emphasized (ADB, 2008; Patrinos & Sosale, 
2009). It will therefore be safe to state that based on the conceptualization of PPPs 
in the academic as well as professional literature, they can be classified as Action 
Networks in terms of public purposes. 
 
Modes of Governance in PPPs 
As the previous sections explored, while there is some consensus on the 
characteristics of PPPs in terms of actor permutations and public purposes, there 
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are also contrasting views at least in the academic literature as to the inclusion or 
exclusion of stakeholders as well as the type of the public purpose to be served by 
a PPP. However, when it comes to the concept of governance within the network, 
academic and practitioner literature is fairly aligned in its understanding. The 
provision of public services is considered the responsibility of the relevant 
government agencies through full or partial input from the private and nonprofit 
sector organizations that bring the required finances, expertise and/or 
administrative infrastructure to the table. A significant example of this 
conceptualization is the emphasis found in Patrinos et al (2009) on the notion that 
the education provided by private funded charter schools in the US "is still public 
education".  
The direct responsibility associated with government agencies towards the 
provision of public service through the PPP warrants the need for a relatively tight 
governance model within the partnership. The lead organization models identified 
by Provan & Kenis (2008) therefore appears to be a good candidate for such a 
governance mechanism. However this structure requires the lead organization to 
have significant know how and practical involvement in the implementation of 
the network's objectives (Provan & Kenis, 2008). Nolte & Boenigk (2011) 
consider the lead organization model to be the most prevalent model in PPPs in a 
disaster context, based on their case study on the PPP response to the Haiti 
earthquake of 2010   
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A number of PPPs these days are also governed with the NAO model (Provan & 
Kenis, 2008) where a government steered administrative organization is 
established to lead the network. This organization can be a for profit joint venture 
or a registered nonprofit organization that develops expertise in network level 
competencies such as coordination facilitation, monitoring and evaluation, 
collective learning and enforcement of accountability measures. 
 
A "Network Governance" Definition of PPPs 
 The above discussion established PPPs as a type of public service 
networks as conceptualized in the network governance literature. Therefore based 
on what we have learned about PPPs so far, Rhodes' (1996) and Sorensen & 
Torfing (2005) conceptualizations can be altered as follows, to provide a 
definition of PPPs grounded in network governance: 
Public Private Partnerships represent the networking of public 
organizations with private and/or voluntary organizations that aim to 
provide one or more public services with a predefined duration and scope. 
All organizations involved act semi-autonomously, although the network is 
meta-governed by a government organization. Rules of such meta-
governance are outlined in formal contracts among organizations. 
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Figure1: Placement of PPP in the Network Governance Classification 
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Network Governance and Public Management 
 
 As discussed earlier in the chapter, every shift in the research imagination 
in public administration has warranted the redefinition of the role played by 
government officials in public service delivery. From technocrats in the 
traditional approaches to parts in a machine in the modern ones, and from 
entrepreneurs of NPM to servants of NPS, no paradigm shift in the study of public 
administration has gone without research on the position and responsibility of 
public administrators or managers in the newly realized situations. The network 
governance approach is no exception. Public service networks formed as a result 
of a government mandate with state agencies directly involved in the network, fall 
within the realm of the Interdependency Theory of meta-governance, specifically 
meta-governance with network participation (Sorensen & Torfing, 2007a). This 
theoretical perspective warrants development of managerial competencies at the 
network level that help public managers facilitate the regulation of self regulated 
network actors.  
 Unlike the conceptual components of network governance, not a lot of 
scholarly work is available to classify the requisite competencies along various 
theoretical and practical dimensions of public management at the network level. 
Denhardt (2010) however points us in the direction of two relatively new 
researches that venture into the analysis of network level management 
competencies in public administration and attempt to classify those as well. These 
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works by Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) and Thomson & Perry (2006) form the 
basis of the following analysis. From this point onwards, this chapter will use the 
term "Network Management" to encompass the entire set of network level 
competencies in public management necessitated by the paradigm shift towards 
network governance.  
 
Managing the Dimensions of Collaboration 
Throughout the public administration literature, the term "Collaboration" is often 
used synonymously with the formation of a public service network. For the 
purpose of this analysis, we can assert that collaboration is the set of process by 
which networks are formed and operated. According to Thomson & Perry (2006), 
in order for public managers to effectively manage collaborations, it is essential 
that they gain a deeper understanding of the processes that culminate into the 
collaboration. These processes can be classified along five variable dimensions, 
namely Governance, Administration, Organizational Autonomy, Mutuality and 
Norms of Trust and Reciprocity.  
 
The Governance Dimension 
According to Thomson & Perry (2006, p24), the governance processes form one 
of the structural dimensions of the collaboration. These processes usually deal 
with the formation of the public service network and outline not only the goals 
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pursued by the network, but also the rules by which actors within the network 
interact with each other. Given that the collaboration is free of hierarchical 
division of labor, the goal of the governance processes is to bring about a 
consensus over the solution to the problem that the network came about to solve 
such that all actors can feel jointly responsible for it. Such a solution might not be 
ideal for all actors, however it does reflect the interests of all actors in a way that 
they find themselves able to support it (p 24). Effective network managers nurture 
this shared sense of responsibility in order to facilitate dynamic negotiation 
processes among actors. The outcome of such dynamic processes is a state of 
equilibrium where conflict is minimized and rules of collaboration are generally 
agreed upon among the actors. 
  
The Administrative Dimension 
The process of administering the collaboration forms another structural dimension 
in Thomson & Perry's (2006) analysis. Using a detailed study of administrative 
competencies from administration in hierarchical as well as networked 
organizational structures, they conclude that a number of administrative 
competencies such as centrality of administration, clear job descriptions and 
accountability mechanisms are as relevant to collaborative administration as they 
are to hierarchical administration. However, the nature of such competencies 
changes in a collaborative environment in the absence of a formal chain of 
command. The need for another set of competencies then arises given this 
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interdependent nature of inter-organizational relationships. These competencies 
deal with the ability of managers to coordinate and administer beyond the scope 
of their respective organizations. Managers are therefore required to build 
interpersonal relationships with peers among different members of the 
collaboration. Such interpersonal relationships complement the organizational 
interdependencies and provide the basis for an administrative framework 
alternative to the leader-manager distinction prevalent in traditional public 
management. 
 
The Autonomy Dimension 
Thomson & Perry (2006) classify the organizational autonomy dimension as an 
Agency dimension of the collaborative processes. This dimension deals with the 
processes where members of the collaboration weigh their organizational goals 
against the overall goals of collaboration. The authors indicate a general 
convergence in Public Administration research on collaboration towards the 
tendency of organizations to contribute to a collaborative goal only if it satisfies 
one or more organizational goals. In other words, organizations in collaborations 
tend to exhibit collaborative behavior only when an immediate need to do so 
arises, while pursuing individual goals all other times. Such individualistic 
behavior creates various tensions and problems within the collaboration. As seen 
in the discussion on the governance dimension, in order for a collaboration to be 
effective, all members need to agree upon goals that each member can take 
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responsibility for. The autonomy dimension helps analyze how organizations 
decide the goals to agree upon. Thomson & Perry (2006) also observe that while 
organizations may not appear too keen to pursue collaborative goals, the cases in 
which they are able to coordinate such goals result in highly effective 
collaborations.  
Based on this analysis, we can conclude that successful management of processes 
along the autonomy dimension requires  network managers to span organizational 
boundaries and facilitate member organizations in realizing their dependency on 
other organizations in order to solve the problem being addressed by the 
collaboration. This realization will not only help them justify the alignment of 
organizational goals with collaboration goals, but will also encourage them to 
share information and resources with other members. By corollary, network 
managers also need to set up systems of checks and balances by which they can 
ensure that member organizations are not trying use the information and resources 
of the collaboration to serve individual goals that are unrelated, or in worse cases, 
detrimental, to the goals targeted by the collaboration.  
 
The Mutuality Dimension 
The mutuality dimension processes deal with matters similar to the governance 
and autonomy dimensions identified by Thomson & Perry (2006) in the sense that 
they are all related to the formation of mutually agreeable agendas within the 
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collaboration. However as opposed to the structural processes of the governance 
dimension or organizational identity and agency related processes of the 
autonomy dimension, processes in the mutuality dimension deal with the building 
of social capital within the collaboration. Effective management of such processes 
require network managers to emphasize not merely on the dynamics of the 
collaboration, such as information sharing and goal setting, but also on the 
reasons for organizations to join the collaboration in the first place. A 
collaboration is expected to be most effective when the need to solve the problem 
targeted by it is reflected in the vision and mission of all of its member 
organizations.  
 
The Trust and Reciprocity Dimension 
This dimension, according to Thomson & Perry (2006), consists of the processes 
responsible for establishing norms for developing social capital within the 
collaboration. The authors use literature on collective action, notably work by 
institutional economists (Olson, 1971; Ostrom, 1998) and institutional 
sociologists (Meyers & Rowan, 1977) to enumerate such norms. They conclude 
that regardless of the formal structure of the collaboration, organizations take their 
time to develop their trust on their peers in the collaboration. Such trust is a key 
factor in the effectiveness of collaboration because as noticed in almost all 
dimensions of collaboration, the network managers are required to build informal 
relationships among member organizations. These informal relationships make 
    47 
the collaboration effective because it eliminates the need for complicated check 
and balance processes and the overheads of additional formal contracts between 
organizations. The willingness of organizations to contribute to the collaboration 
almost always depends on their perception of reciprocity by other members. The 
presence of well established norms in a collaboration that ensure equitable 
contribution of all members to the collective goals, and reduce the need for 
complex formal arrangements complements the social capital built by the sense of 
shared purpose developed in the processes along the mutuality dimension and 
hence forms the foundation of a strong collaboration. 
 
Network Management in PPPs 
 
 The previous section provided us with certain dimensions of network 
management that encompass various aspects of the formation and operation of 
public service networks. This section will attempt to map these dimensions over 
the available literature on the management of PPPs. The literature piece primarily 
used for this purpose is Goldsmith & Eggers (2004). This piece has been selected 
for its origins in mainstream public administration while keeping its focus on 
formation of networks between governments and public and voluntary 
organizations with the government organization serving as the core. Not only is 
their approach consistent with the definition of PPPs developed in this chapter, 
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they also cite several examples of PPPs while presenting their analysis on 
different aspects of governing by networks.  
 Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) consider the government organization at the 
core of the network responsible for leading most of the processes that Thomson & 
Perry (2006) would classify in the Governance dimension. According to 
Goldsmith & Eggers (2004), the network managers at the government agency at 
the core of the network should choose carefully what private or voluntary 
organizations are to be made a part of the network and what responsibilities are to 
be assigned to them. They also warn against making the private or voluntary 
organizations responsible for making network level decision. In terms of the 
governance dimension processes within PPPs, this translates into the elimination 
of the potentially long negotiations among network members to decide on the 
mutually agreeable network goals since the goals are provided by the government 
core and intent to support the goals is made a precondition for joining the 
network. 
 In the administrative dimension, Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) support 
Thomson & Perry's (2006) view that while the purpose of the administrative tasks 
might appear similar, such as coordination and accountability etc, the nature of 
these tasks changes significantly in a network setting. Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) 
note that most government organizations come to their first network without any 
knowledge or even appreciation for network level competencies. It is therefore 
important for the government core of the PPP to not base its management 
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strategies on its existing capabilities but to show an openness towards learning 
new skills that can cater to the requirements of the most effective network design.  
 In order to effectively govern the processes that Thomson & Perry (2006) 
would classify in the autonomy dimension, Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) 
recommend that network managers make sure to announce not only the network 
goals, but its values as clearly as possible to all members. They also need to 
provide as many points of direct and indirect communication to the member 
organizations as possible. Clarity of values and availability of points of 
communication provides opportunities for network members to develop shared 
values, which in turn facilitates the acceptance of shared goals. Network 
managers in a PPP also need to develop accountability mechanisms based strictly 
on merit to ensure that a member organization cannot use its reputation or 
political clout to sway the network's outcomes for its individual benefit at the cost 
of other member's interests. 
 The clear announcement of network goals and values also helps network 
managers while managing the processes that fall under Thomson & Perry's (2006) 
mutuality dimension. According to Goldsmith & Eggers (2004), government 
organizations at the core of the network should outline their expectations 
meticulously and then present them to the potential partner nonprofits and for-
profit organizations as clearly as possible. The service contracts made between the 
government core and the private branches of a PPP should  be made dynamic in 
nature so that they can be adjusted based on the collective learning of the network 
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and reduce transaction costs for the partners that will encourage organizations to 
participate towards the network goals. Usage of information technology to 
increase the points of contact is an example of a strategy that helps manage the 
autonomy processes, at the same time lowering the transaction costs for 
communicating parties. 
Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) consider trust to be the essence of collaboration. In an 
argument similar to Thomson & Perry (2006) they conclude that the facilitation of 
informal relationships and normative contracts among members of a network 
helps develop trust and lowers transaction costs. A very important skill that the 
network managers can develop in this regard is of cross cultural management. 
Since members of PPPs come from different organizational sectors, it is highly 
likely that the personnel are accustomed to organizational cultures alien to each 
other. Network managers can therefore span the boundaries of their respective 
organizations by educating themselves about the cultures of the partnering 
organizations. This practice makes for effective communication which in turn 
increases mutual trust within the PPP. It can therefore be concluded that trust & 
reciprocity is the most important dimension of processes in PPP management as it 
complements all other dimensions. Effective trust building lowers transaction 
costs, reduces the need for accountability, makes way for simpler administrative 
structures and facilitates shared decision making. Table 2 provides a map of 
network management competencies outlined by Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) as 
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they become relevant to the collaborative management dimensions described by 
Thomson & Perry (2006). 
 
Collaborative 
Management 
Dimension 
Required Managerial 
Outcomes 
Recommendations for 
PPP Network Managers 
Governance Mutual goal setting 
Selection of appropriate 
collaboration partners 
Government core selects 
contractors 
Government core houses 
network managers that 
serve as architects for 
collaboration and set goals 
and values 
Administrative Development of distinct 
network level competencies 
Network managers need to 
"forget" what they know 
about the administrative 
practices in hierarchical 
settings 
Autonomy Increased information 
sharing 
Accountability for 
Network managers provide 
more avenues of 
communication 
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individual versus collective 
objectives 
Network managers provide 
a system of checks and 
balances 
Mutuality Everyone has a shared 
interest in collaboration 
Network managers define 
and clearly communicate 
network values 
Network managers take 
measures to reduce 
transaction costs 
Reciprocity and 
Trust 
Informal relationships 
among collaborators 
Reduction in complex legal 
contracts 
Network managers 
encourage usage of 
information technology in 
communication 
Network managers 
increased points of 
communications among 
contractors 
Network managers develop 
boundary spanning 
capabilities 
Network managers adapt to 
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cross cultural environments 
 
Table 2: Network Management in PPPs 
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Chapter 3 
POWER IN PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
Chapter 3: Power in Public Private Partnerships 
 
Introduction 
 
The role of power in public service networks has become one of the major areas 
of study in the field of network governance (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; 
Sorensen & Torfing, 2006). This chapter furthers extant research by using the 
literature on power in organizational behavior and theory to better explain power 
dynamics in network governance, especially in Public Private Partnerships 
(PPPs). It begins with developing a basic understanding of the concept of power 
in organizational behavior and theory, leading into a typology of power based on 
different theoretical perspectives observed in literature. It then proceeds to an 
overview of the existing literature on power in network governance and identifies 
the points where theories from organizational studies can be applied to power in 
PPPs. The chapter concludes by providing a basic framework for studying power 
dynamics in PPPs using this new approach.   
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Emergence of The Concept - Power in Organization Theory 
 Power in and around organizations has established itself as a major aspect 
of organization theory in the past few decades. This significance is evident in the 
fact that at present, there is hardly a textbook on organization theory that does not 
list power among the key topics in literature. Significant examples include Hatch 
(1997), Scott and Davis (2007), Daft (2009) and so on. The current popularity of 
the topic makes it almost counter intuitive to imagine that about 50 years ago, 
power was hardly a research interest within organization theory, let alone a key 
aspect of the field. Discussions on organizations remained around their structures 
and their abilities to perform various functions. Power therefore was seen as 
something supervisors in the organizational hierarchy could use to get an efficient 
output from their subordinates (Weber, 1958). Simon (1947) was among the first 
to view organizations as decision making systems. Further research by March & 
Simon (1958) and others in the later years probed further into decision making 
within organization. Challenges to the rational decision making model made way 
for models of organizational decision making that could account for ambiguity, 
conflict of interest, and other issues that could not be covered under the 
assumption or rationality.  
 Now social scientists, from Hellenistic philosophers to postmodern 
scholars, have used different perspectives and metaphors to look at organizations 
(Hatch, 1997). Depending on the epistemological routes taken by theorists, they 
can choose to observe organizations as hierarchical structures designed to perform 
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specific functions (machines), homogenous systems adapting to the changes in 
environment (organisms), patterns of shared values (cultures), learning and 
information processing systems (brains), decision making and conflict 
management systems (political systems), systems for crafting human psychology 
(psychic prisons), art forms combining various perspectives (collage) and last but 
not the least, tools of domination (Hatch, 1997; Morgan, 2006). 
 The new found emphasis on decision making systems and anomalies 
therein created an opportunity for supporters of the “organization as political 
order” metaphor. The discussion was not contained to the decision making 
processes, but issues like control over means of production (resources) and 
methods of productions (actions) were also brought back to life within the scope 
of organizations (March & Olsen, 1984). The popularity of the political order 
metaphor brought a drastic change in the way power was viewed in organizational 
theory literature. The machine metaphor of classical organizational theorists saw 
formal authority as the only desirable form of power. Other forms of power were 
supposed to give rise to inefficiency (Weber, 1958). The modernist view worked 
with an assumption of rationality. Power was a factor that could affect rationality 
hence power was seen as an anomaly in the rational decision making process 
(Hatch, 1997). The political order metaphor helped organizational theorists 
research into different forms of powers and use them as integral components of 
the organizational discourse.   
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 The case for power in organizations was made in the behavioral 
economics literature when empirical studies conducted by March & Simon (1958) 
uncovered the ambiguity and conflict in organizational decision making, as 
opposed to the existence of final and mutually agreeable solutions to all 
organizational problems. The relational nature of power called for social 
psychologists to contribute to the concept as well, hence we see the seminal work 
of French & Raven (1959) expanding on that. Not surprisingly, political scientists 
such as Dahl (1961) and Luke (1974) and many others, form the bulk of 
contributors to the concept. Power in the recent past has become an integral part 
of organizational studies and there have been significant contributions to the 
literature from organizational theorists such as Mintzberg (1983) and more 
recently Clegg, Courpasson & Phillips (2006). 
 
Theoretical Perspectives on Power in Organizations 
 The literature on power in organization theory comes from several fields 
of social science. In terms of the generally accepted theoretical paradigms, the 
concept of power in organization has been discussed by functionalists (Weber, 
1958; Simon, 1947), structuralists and post-structuralists (Lukes, 1974; Foucault, 
1980; Foucault, 2000), new institutionalists (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983) and so 
on. In terms of theoretical background, power has been studied by psychologists 
(French & Raven, 1959; Cialdini, 2001), sociologists (Perrow, 2002; Grewal, 
2008) and of course political scientists (Bacharach & Baratz, 1962). The study of 
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power was not always seen as an integral part of organization studies. This was 
because power did not fit into the modern methods of research, nor could it be 
defined as rules that could be mechanically applied. It is interesting to note that 
while power has expanded into all forms of organizational analysis, its anomalous 
nature is still a topic of study both in and outside academic literature. 
Among the metaphors Morgan (2006) uses to look at organizations, a particularly 
interesting one is “organizations as tools of domination”. While a considerable 
amount of literature can be reviewed regarding the relationship of an organization 
with its members as well as its institutional environment, not much academic 
literature can be found on the power amassed in, and exploited by an organization 
as it interacts with its social and political environment. Perrow (2002) has 
attempted to analyze the enormous power gathered by large organizations in the 
United States over the past two centuries. He claims that large organizations, in 
addition to controlling a large number of national assets, are capable of defining 
the social structure of the present day society in the US. He identifies two 
significant sources of this power gain, the massive collection of wealth within 
organizations as a result of mass production and mass distribution and the 
multinational corporation’s insensitivity to local and regional issues. 
While Perrow touches upon types and sources of power unheard of in the 
organizational theory literature, Jackall (1988) raises an issue considering a more 
familiar language. He believes that individuals who enter bureaucratic 
organizations find themselves in an environment packed with standard procedures 
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and chain of command. Working under unquestioned formal authority requires 
them to be more loyal to their immediate supervisor than anything else. He cites 
the case of deliberate pollution of Hudsion River by General Electric a few years 
ago, where middle managers had gone ahead with the decision, despite being 
ethical and environmentally conscious people in their personal lives. He therefore 
sees the organizations as “moral mazes” where the power of the system 
suppresses an individual’s morality. 
Seeing that power has been studied at various levels of analysis and with different 
units of analysis, it will be a good idea to guide our analysis by a typology 
relevant to the subject matter being studied. Keeping in mind that this discussion 
will eventually focus on power in organizational networks, it makes sense to 
distinguish theories on power on the basis of their treatment of organizations as 
open or closed systems. Similarly it will be important to distinguish theories that 
treat power as a resource, something that can be observed, collected and utilized 
from theories that treat power as an inherent property of relationships that may or 
may not be fully observable. Finally, a relatively obvious distinction will be 
among theories that deal with power at various levels and units of analysis within 
an organizational network. Given the relational nature of power, such a distinction 
will identify theories on power at the interpersonal, inter group and inter 
organizational levels. 
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Power as an Organizational Commodity 
 These theories usually treat power as something that can be attained by a 
certain actor and can be used to gain certain advantages in an organization. Such 
attainment and usage of power is called politics (Pfeffer, 1994). These theories 
usually deal with the perception of power within an organization in terms of 
symbols, resources or abilities that constitute power, identify the actors that hold 
that power and the characteristics or tactics that enable them to hold and use such 
power. Based on the definition of power and interactions between internal and 
external organizational actors, these theories can be classified into two categories, 
i.e. theories that treat organizations as closed systems and theories that treat 
organizations as open systems.  
 
Organizations As Closed Systems 
Theories that treat organizations as closed systems deal with the power 
differences within organizational actors regardless of the interaction of those 
actors with the organization's environment. Power in such theories is often 
constituted as one actor's ability to coerce the other actor to perform a certain 
action. Pfeffer (1981) enlists a number of definitions that define power in terms of 
ability of an actor to coerce another actor into committing a non voluntary action. 
These theories mark the early contributions to the literature on power in 
organization theory and can be classified into two major types, apolitical theories, 
that treat power as a legitimate organizational resource and political theories that 
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focus on the usage of power within organizations for purposes other than fulfilling 
stated organizational goals. 
 
 
Apolitical Theories  
Weber (1958) is one of the first scholars who discussed the role of power in 
organizations. He identified three types of power in a hierarchical structure: 
Legitimate or formal, traditional and charismatic. He also distinguished between 
power and authority. According to him, a power exercised by a supervisor 
becomes authority when the subordinate sees it as legitimate. Formal authority 
therefore was a desirable form of power that could ensure enhanced efficiency. 
Traditional power was a result of the supremacy enjoyed by certain organizational 
actors due to their position in society. Charismatic power was the power amassed 
by individuals using their personal traits such as knowledge and expertise or 
social networking. While Weber presented an explanation of the concept of power 
in organizations, the first operational definition of power came a few decades 
after his death. Dahl (1961) defined power as the ability of an actor A to influence 
another actor B into doing something that B will otherwise not do. Power was 
therefore a function of the social relationship between two organizational actors.  
Dahl’s was not the only voice sounding on the relational nature of power. French 
& Raven (1959) published their seminal work on the sources of relational power 
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around the same time. Their work had a lasting impact on the literature and their 
bases of power are still an essential part of every literature review on power. The 
following are the bases of power as identified by them: 
 Reward power is the ability of an organizational actor to hold resources 
that will be desirable to other actors. The actor in possession of those resources 
will therefore be able to influence other actors who will work with an anticipation 
to get a share of those resources as rewards. Use of reward power helps reduce 
resistance among organizational relationships. 
Coercive power is the ability of an organizational actor to withhold certain 
resources that other organizational actors value. The actor in control of such 
resources will become powerful as the other actors fear deprivation of the valued 
resources as punishment for non conformance. Use of coercive power increases 
resistance among organizational relationships. 
Legitimate power comes from the role of the supervisor as framed in the formal 
job description. It can include the right to exercise reward or coercive power. 
Coercive power generates lesser resistance if used as legitimate power. 
Referential power is a result of the informal relationships between two 
organizational actors. Personal friendships and group camaraderie are significant 
sources of this power. However these relationships can also stem from indirect 
affiliations among two organizational actors such as similar natures of job, similar 
task group, religious or political affiliations etc. 
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Expert power is the possession of knowledge resources by an organizational actor 
that are considered valuable by other organizational actors. Expert power can also 
be used to strengthen legitimate power, as the perceived legitimacy of authority 
by a subordinate is increased with a high perception of supervisor’s expertise. 
French & Raven (1959) concluded that power driven from each of these bases is 
dependant on the importance given by organizational actors to the resources 
involved in the basis. Each basis is limited by scope hence expert power might not 
work in areas where coercive power is required. 
Etzioni (1973) used the bases of power to one of the first power-based analyses of 
organizations. He used classification similar to French & Raven (1959), however 
he defined organizations are systems based on one or the other bases of power. 
Prisons and lunatic asylums therefore were home to coercive power whereas 
workplaces were reward power centers where people went in anticipation of 
gaining resources. Normative power as defined by him was similar to French & 
Raven’s referential power and was characterized by institutions such as places of 
worship and social networking groups etc. 
Most of the early theories were concerned with the sources and usage of power 
for the positions of high authority. Mechanic (1962) however noticed that 
opportunity to gain expert and referential powers is available to organizational 
actors regardless of their position in the hierarchy. Lower level actors can acquire 
power in an organization if they gain expertise that is makes them irreplaceable in 
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the organization. Pfeffer (1981) conducted experiments in a cigarette factory 
where he noticed that repair workers were able to enjoy a special respect from line 
workers considerably higher than them in terms of pay scale. One of the reasons 
identified for this was the fact that the lengthy training process for the repair work 
made them hard to replace. The position of lower level actors in the 
organizational structure can prove another source of power if they serve as a point 
of access to someone with higher authority. This was in some ways similar to 
Crozier’s (1964) study of bureaucracy where he noticed that bureaucrats often use 
their expertise to gain far more than the legitimate power assigned tot them. The 
reverse was studied when Kanter (1979) used the bases of power to explain the 
leadership failure in organizations. The research concluded that in order to be 
successful, an organizational leader has to makes use of different bases of power. 
For example, reward power was to be used not only to reinforce productivity but 
also to empower the subordinates that could create more support than ordinarily 
expected. Similarly coercive power was to be avoided as the resistance produced 
as a result could reduce overall support. Failure to manage powers can result in a 
situation where the formal authority is cancelled out completely by resistances in 
other scopes of power, leaving the leader powerless. 
 
Political Theories 
The previous section has discussed various theories about the sources and 
application of power. However all theories assume a certain notion of fairness 
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towards the availability and accessibility of power. It is inherent in all these 
theories that power is there to be taken over by anyone who can become eligible 
by holding on to one of its sources. This approach has received a lot of criticism 
especially from the postmodern and the feminist schools of thought. Both these 
bodies of literature generally discuss the problems associated with the hidden 
faces of power. The concerns in both critiques however differ both in terms of 
arguments as well as conclusions. 
 
Two Faces of Power 
While power in organizations was still a budding concept, Bacharach & Baratz 
(1962) voiced their concerns about one’s ability to observe power in action. They 
saw power as having a visible and an invisible face. The visible face could be 
viewed using Dahl’s (1961) definition and could be analyzed using French & 
Raven’s (1959) sources of power. However the invisible face was there to limit 
this analysis. They used the classical “A has power over B” analogy to explain 
their argument. The visible face of power was the one used by A to make B do 
what A wants. However the invisible face made sure that B did not have any other 
option than to conforming to A. This limiting of options was done by A through 
influencing the language B uses to phrase the problem, by having power on B’s 
ideology and sense of identity and by framing the problem in a way that other 
options clash with the values and norms that B follows. 
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The hidden face of power has received considerable attention from postmodernist 
scholars such as Lukes (1974) who developed his “three dimensional” view of 
power in society. He placed authority on one dimension, the other forms of visible 
power on the second dimension and on the third dimension he placed the invisible 
face of power. The characteristics of invisible power according to Lukes include 
ability to influence personal preferences of other individuals through altering 
norms and values, assigning meaning to language and pre determining decision 
outcomes by shaping ideology and identity. 
While the concept of the invisible face of power has been accepted without much 
criticism in literature, there is considerable debate about a scholar’s ability to 
measure the impact of invisible power. The major problem with measure invisible 
power is the fact that the reason for invisibility is the incorporation of the tools of 
power into the subject’s thought. The exercise of invisible power appears more 
like normal behavior to both the powerful and the powerless (Luke, 1974). 
However this also implies that power exists to some extent in all organizational 
relationship, whether or not power is being visibly exercised. This perspective 
opened research avenues for theorists who studied organizations as control 
mechanisms (Clegg, 1983; Clegg, Courpasson & Phillips, 2006).  
With the development of techniques of organizational discourse analysis, it might 
become possible in the near future to study the impact of the invisible side of 
power. Lewis et al. (2003) have conducted studies in various non profit 
organizations in which they have used ethnography as a tool for the interpretation 
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of organization culture through the analysis of language of the organizational 
discourse as well as the informal communication between organization members. 
 
Gender and Power 
Gender critiques of power in organization suggest clear patterns of gender 
discrimination among organizations. Women are believed to encounter glass 
ceilings (Morgan, 2006) when pursuing high positions in a lot of organizations. 
While the literature on gender issues with power is multidirectional, two types of 
critical theories emerge appear more popular than the others. These theories deal 
with gender and the invisible face of power and the role of power as a source of 
power. 
Morgan (2006), among many others has attempted to analyze the stereotypes 
associated with organizations and has matched them to the gender stereotypes. 
His study showed that the keywords associated with most of the organizations 
were strategic, rational, decision oriented, tough and aggressive. The list of 
keyword had an incredible resemblance to the list of male stereotypes that he 
collected. He further suggests that similar male stereotypes exist in many rituals 
within organizations. Therefore women working in those organizations are either 
forced to stay behind in the career race or to adopt a “masculine” profile. Hagberg 
(2003) also came to similar conclusion and developed a path to power for women 
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managers, which she argues is more complicated and difficult to achieve than the 
path male managers have to follow to achieve similar authority in an organization. 
The other body of critical literature on gender issues with power comes from 
feminists in the neo-Marxist tradition (Hatch, 1997). These scholars argue that 
women are marginalized in male dominated organizations through the exercise 
power. This critique, in addition to posing a serious question, opens the floor for 
another array of questions about the use of power as a source of power. 
 
Power as a Source of Power 
Morgan (2006) discusses the different ways organizational actors can use their 
existing power to gain more power. The most common is the “log rolling” 
scenario where one powerful individual helps another powerful individual in the 
time of need who returns the favor in a similar situation. The reward power can 
also be used to create cognitive biases among subordinates that will result in 
gaining more support from them than could have acquired by actual rewarding.   
Bies & Tripp (1998) picked a similar lead and conducted a research to study how 
employees cope with tyrant bosses. Tyranny was operationalized as the exercise 
of power by the supervisor to gain more conformance from the subordinate than 
mandated by legitimate authority. The bosses in those organizations were found to 
be trying to change the ways the employees thought. This was seen as a way of 
reducing resistance that was supposed to increase the overall effect of power and 
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influence. The studies however showed that in most of the cases the employees 
simply developed a “two-faced” approach towards their bosses. They would 
appear to conform in front of the boss but were actually growing more and more 
resentful, which was having a negative impact on the organization’s productivity. 
It therefore appears that while reward power can be used to create situations 
where one can gain power and at the same time increase organizational 
productivity, the same cannot be achieved through coercive power. Therefore the 
use of visible power to marginalize subordinates does not seem logical for a self 
interested organizational leader. However going back to Bacharach & Baratz’s 
(1962) criticism of Dahl’s (1961) definition of power, it seems like A can 
marginalize B without making it obvious. The three dimensions of power 
discussed by Lukes (1974) also provide the tools for exercising power using those 
dimensions. A case can be made where senior management can inculcate a culture 
where the standard practices will create an environment unwelcome for women 
although there will be no visible indication of the marginalization. An example of 
such organizations is cited by Hatch (1997) that only accepts women as 
secretaries. 
 
Organizational Power versus Leadership 
 In addition to the apolitical and the political theories of power in 
organizations, there are some other theories that exist mainly in the organizational 
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behavior literature that discuss the role the ability of one organizational actor to 
have an effect on the actions of another actor beyond the organization's formal 
chain of command. These theories, instead of dealing with the source of power or 
the usage of power, deal with the social psychological interactions that result in 
one actor's conformity to the other actor's wishes. Cialdini (2001) describes six 
reasons why people are able to change the actions of others without being in a 
formally coercive position. He calls these reasons "weapons of influence" use of 
which comprises what he calls the "art of persuasion". According to him, a person 
is likely to do something favorable for one person if he/she believes that it is in 
return for a past or future favorable action, hence being persuaded by 
"reciprocity". "Commitment and consistency" is another one of Cialdini's (2001) 
weapons of influence and applies to situation where people follow through with 
their initial decisions even when the conditions under which the decisions were 
made no longer exist. Making oneself liked by others can also improve one's 
ability to persuade them in decision making situations as Cialdini considers 
"liking" as a weapon of influence. Cialdini's work also shows that in uncertain 
situations, one can persuade someone to take a specific decision if it can be shown 
that other people are taking similar decisions, hence influencing by "social proof". 
Similarly, in uncertain situations, an actor can increase the chances of persuasion 
by limiting the amount of time or resources involved in the decision to be taken 
by the other actor as "scarcity" is another one of Cialdini's weapons of influence. 
Formal authority can also reach beyond the structural chains of command and can 
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persuade people to take decisions contrary to their moral beliefs or logical 
reasoning, hence making "authority" another weapon of influence according to 
Cialdini. 
 Perhaps the best known organizational phenomenon in which one 
organizational actor is able to influence the ideas and/or actions of other 
organizational actors is of leadership. Unlike the negative connotations often 
attached with the practice of organizational politics (Peffer, 1994, p 13-14), 
leadership is often reflected positively upon by researchers and practitioners alike. 
This is evident in Nahavandi's (2003) definition of leadership that consolidates a 
number of theoretical and practical definitions of leadership available in extant 
literature: 
"A leader is a person who influences groups and individuals in an 
organization, helps them establish goals, and guides them towards 
achievement of those goals, thereby allowing them to be effective." 
 It will therefore be safe to assume that leadership is the use of power and 
strategies of influence that are generally accepted in an organization to ensure 
pursuit of legitimate organizational goals. There are however exceptions to this 
assumption pointed out by authors such as Lipman-Blumen (2005) that study the 
examples of toxic leaders who use their leadership abilities for personal gains 
against the organizational objectives. While a number of texts including 
Nahavandi (2003) do not require an organizational leader to be in a position of 
formal authority, the rest of this chapter will focus only on leaders that are 
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formally responsible for managing other organizational actors. Similar to the 
sources and forms of power discussed in the above sections, a number of theories 
exist on the practices of leadership and sources of the leader's influence. These 
theories are summarized below: 
 
Theories of organizational Leadership 
 A number of scholars in the early days of organizational theory did not 
differentiate between a leader and a manager (Bernard, 1938; Weber, 1958). A 
leader in the traditional view was just a person of high ability who held a high 
position in the societal or organizational hierarchy whose influence came from 
legal authority. However Weber (1958) did see, as an exceptional case, a few 
leaders who could get more out of the subordinates than what normal authority 
will warrant. This special quality was called the leader’s “charisma”. A number of 
theories in traditional literature have tried to search for the qualities or traits that 
give a leader such an influence over his or her followers (Ott et al., 1989). These 
traits range from fulfilling certain responsibilities within an organization such as 
providing the vision and mission, staffing, and creating effective channels of 
communication (Bernard, 1938) to personal attributes of a leader's personality 
such as emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1998). 
 Trait theories were disappointing for some scholars because while they 
listed general traits of an effective leader, they did not provide much input for 
developing effective leadership strategies or improving one's leadership 
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capabilities. This gave rise to the transactional theories of leadership. These 
theories focused on the interactions of leaders with their followers and researched 
styles of the leadership required in various scenarios, paying attention to the task 
at hand and the relationship dynamics between the leader and the followers. 
 Among the most popular style theories is Fielder’s (1970) contingent 
leadership model. Fielder conducted empirical research that showed that 
authoritative leaders were more successful in environments where employees did 
not like their jobs. While more permissive leaders were effective where the 
employees were excited about the work they did. This led Fielder to postulate that 
the leader’s effectiveness is contingent upon the fit of the leader’s personality 
(authoritative versus permissive) to the subordinate’s motivation to work. Since it 
is hard to change someone’s personality, high level employers should take caution 
in positioning appropriate leaders above appropriate groups of subordinates. 
 Another significant contribution to transactional theories is Follett's (1926) 
situational leadership model. According to her, a leader is bound to fail in getting 
orders executed if the followers are not capable of performing the required task. 
This inability could come from communication failure or the complexity of the 
task being beyond the follower’s capacity. In such a situation, a leader should 
participate in carrying out of the task. Hersey & Blanchard (1969) further 
developed this theory by analyzing leadership strategies in two dimensions, 
relationship and complexity. Relationship abstracted the willingness of the 
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employee to perform a task for the leader, and complexity of the task meant the 
ability of the follower to perform it. According to Hersey & Blanchard’s matrix: 
• For easy task and high willingness, the leader should delegate the task. 
• For easy task and low willingness, the leader should tell the followers to 
perform. 
• For complex task and low willingness, the leader should sell the task by 
motivating the followers to do it. 
• Finally, for complex task and high willingness, the leader should 
participate in the task to help the followers. 
Scholars such as Burns (1978) have raised questions about the status of 
transactional theories as leadership theories versus management theories and have 
noticed that most transactional strategies do not result in the creation of any 
additional influence other than what originates from the manager's formal 
authority. The cultural and transformational leadership theories explain the 
sources of such influence better. 
 Schein (1992) defines organizational culture as a shared set of 
assumptions, values and artifacts that are shared by all stakeholders in the 
organizations their effectiveness has been established by success in the past and 
therefore are taught to the new entrants to the organization. According to cultural 
theorists such as Schein and Pettigrew, organizational culture is responsible for 
almost everything that takes place in the organization from employee’s motivation 
to work, their understanding of the organizational vision to the power structures in 
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the organization. Organizational culture theorists therefore emphasize the ability 
of the leader to define the organizational culture. The leader’s actions determine 
the assumptions that will be taken as given in the organization. Similarly the 
leader will vanguard the organizational values and will oversee the development 
of the cultural artifacts. This way a leader will lead not only by personal charisma 
but also and more importantly by the ability to reshape the intellectual and 
cognitive foundations of the followers. Similar to the culture theories, the 
transformational leadership theories emphasize on the leader’s ability to help the 
followers share the vision that the leader has set for the organization (Tichy & 
Ulrich, 1984; Burns, 1978). The leader brings in the transformation by easing out 
the fears and uncertainties by making them see the vision of future success and 
instilling belief in the leader’s values through leading by example.  
 Another attempt to find the elements that provide a leader with the 
influence unmatched by a regular manager with similar formal authority has been 
made by Denhardt & Denhardt (2006) in their "dance of leadership" theory. They 
conclude that effective leaders gain that special influence through interactions 
with their followers in a way similar to how performing artists connect with their 
audiences. An effective leader appeals not only to the logical side of his or her 
follower but also the emotional and imaginative side. Leadership abilities 
therefore are not perfected through management trainings but in a way a dance is 
rehearsed. Good leaders are able to understand the interplay of space, time and 
energy, are able to understand the rhythms of human interaction, can 
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communicate through symbols, images and metaphors, can improvise with 
creativity and can cultivate leadership skills within themselves that are consistent 
with their own core values (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2006).  
 
 
Organizations As Open Systems 
 The study of organizations as open systems was made popular by theorists 
like Dill (1958), Evan (1966) and Thompson (1967). Being open systems, 
organizations were expected to be influenced by variables external to the 
organization such as cultural norms of the society, changes in technology and 
knowledge, laws and regulations and competition with other organizations for 
resources such as capital, labor, supplies and customers (Selznick, 1957; Dill, 
1958; Evan, 1966; Thompson, 1967; Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Scott, 1987). This 
had significant implications on the ways by which organizational actors would 
obtain and use power on internal and external organizational actors. The two 
significant approaches to organizational power and politics that treat 
organizations as open systems are organizational environment theories of power 
and new institutionalist perspective on organizational power.  
 
Organizational Environment Theories 
Aldrich & Pfeffer (1976) theorized that the external environment of an 
organization provides a number of resources that the organization is dependant 
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upon. These resources include essential inputs and opportunities for output 
consumption. The organization, however shares those resources with a number of 
other organizations. Due to the scarcity of resources, organizations are always in 
competition with each other. 
The strategic contingency theory (Salanick & Pfeffer, 1977) carries this 
discussion into the organization. The organization’s dependence on scarce 
external resources adds significantly to the value of assets capable of acquiring 
those resources. This appreciation in value assigns power to the individuals in the 
organization who are in possession of the assets. This assignment is reflected in 
the structure of the organization that places those individuals on positions of high 
formal authority and increased autonomy. Structuring of an organization as a 
response to its external environment has also been discussed by Mintzberg (1979) 
who considers the environment as one of the variables that determines the 
complexity of an organization’s structure.  
According to the strategic contingency theory, a change in the external 
environment might change the structure of the resources it offers to the 
organization. Strategic contingency theory will therefore necessitate 
reorganization within organization. This reorganization will result in the selection 
of actors who are capable of accessing the external resources in the changed 
environment. Hence power might move hands from some individuals to the other 
as an organization attempts to align itself to its environment. As a corollary, 
ability of an organizational actor to predict and cope with ambiguity can prove to 
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be one of the most important sources of holding on to power (Morgan, 2006; 
Pfeffer, 1981).  
It is important to note that the strategic contingency theory, like the theories 
studied in the previous section, places power as a function of the organization’s 
structure (Pfeffer, 1981; Salanick & Pfeffer, 1977). However power in this case is 
exogenous (March & Olsen, 1984) while the earlier models treated power as 
generating within the organization. 
 
Power as a Relational Function 
The theories on organizational power discussed above treat power as something 
that can be collected, held and used by organizational actors. Power therefore is 
often observable and measurable. Some actors will have more power than the 
other and this power difference will be reflected in any organizational relationship 
established between those actors. Weber (1958) was one of the first to distinguish 
the compulsory subordinate behavior of organizational actors resulting from the 
exercise of power by a more powerful actor from the voluntary subordinate 
behavior exhibited by organizational actors towards organizational actors of 
higher authority without any direct influence or coercion. This means that at least 
part of organizational power lies not with the actor exercising power but within 
the relationship where power is being exercised. Theories that treat power as a 
function of the relationships between different organizational actors as opposed to 
a commodity can be classified into two broad categories. The first category 
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contains theories based on individual rationality. New Institutionalism in 
organization theory is home to most of these organizations. The other category 
consists of theories that treat organizational relationships as reflective of social 
structures existing in the world that the organization exists in. Most of these 
theories deal with the classification of power into various dimensions of social 
interactions between the actors inside and outside the organization. 
  
New Institutionalism 
The return of institutionalism or “new institutionalism” in social sciences opened 
new avenues for research in many areas of social sciences. Dimaggio & Powell 
(1983) brought new institutionalism to organization theory. 
 The advent of New Institutionalism to organization theory resulted in the 
rediscovery of a number of organization theory concepts by institutionalists 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This new line of research opened up avenues for the 
study of a number of environmental variables that had been overlooked in 
resource dependence literature. These variables included societal norms, rules and 
regulations, shared values and advancement in shared knowledge and technology 
(Scott, 1992). The impact of societal values and their impact on an organization 
was discussed by scholars as early as Selznick (1957). According to new 
institutionalists, organizational environments accumulate norms and values that 
define rational behavior through social and technical learning over a period of 
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time (Meyer, 1994). An organization, as a rational actor feels pressurized to 
conform to these norms and values (Scott, 1992). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
differentiate between different kinds of pressures an environment puts on an 
organization for such compliance. The pressures that make an organization 
conform with local laws and regulations as well as international standards and 
codes of conduct are labeled “coercive pressures”. On the other hand, 
professionals within an organizations often try to conform with the norms 
developed by local or international professional organizations, hence pressuring 
the organization to adopt those norms as well. For example, doctors in the US, 
regardless of their hospital affiliation, are likely to conform with norms 
established by the American Medical Association, resulting in a uniform behavior 
among hospitals all over the country in the areas of practice governed by those 
norms. Such pressures coming from professional organizations with no legal 
authority are called "normative pressures" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Powell & 
DiMaggio, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In uncertain situations, organizations 
might feel pressurized to follow the footsteps of other organizations in a relevant 
industry. Such pressures are titled by DiMaggio & Powell as “mimetic pressures”. 
 While both discuss an organization's relationship with its environment, the 
main difference between new institutionalist view of power and the strategic 
dependency theory is about the way organizational structures develop. Strategic 
contingency theory considers an organization as responding to the environment by 
indigenously creating its structure. Institutionalism on the other hand suggests that 
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the organizational structures are developed by adapting existing societal structures 
to the organization. By corollary, the major difference between institutional 
theory of power and the resource based theories is that in resource based theories, 
power is treated as a relational phenomenon. Institutionalism on the other hand 
views power as a reciprocal phenomenon. It does fit not into Dahl’s (1961) 
influence based definition, but it just defines how the powerful in an organization 
are differentiated from the powerless.  
 
Multidimensional Theories of Power 
In his seminal work on power, Lukes (1974) identifies three dimensions of power. 
The first dimension runs along the well known formal sources of power and the 
practice of politics, such as formal authority, knowledge and so on. The other 
dimension deals with behavioral elements of influence, much like the items 
discussed earlier in this paper under the headings of influence and leadership. The 
third dimension takes a more relational approach. Lukes (1974), like Bacharach & 
Baratz (1962) observes that the traditional approaches to study power always 
assume decision making situations where there is a conflict and hence power is 
used to resolve the conflict. However these theories ignore the fact that 
organizational actors with enough power can actually decide what options are 
available to the decision making party to chose from in such situation, or for that 
matter, whether or not to allow the conflict to be a part of the organization's 
agenda, hence keeping the other party subordinated without even letting the need 
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to use overt power. This dimension of power therefore assumes power as 
something that is always present in the nature of a social relationship between 
people at varying levels of authority as opposed to something that comes up only 
in transactions. However unlike Bacharach & Baratz (1962) who treat power as a 
property of the organizational actor, Lukes' (1974) three dimensional approach 
sets up power as a property of the relationship. So actor A can coerce actor B not 
because A is a more powerful actor than B but because given the nature of the 
organizational structure, A and B enter into a relationship that puts A at a position 
of higher power than B. The relationship therefore is where all power lies, 
whether it is obvious or hidden. 
The third dimension as discovered by Lukes (1974) also resonates in the works of 
Foucault (1980; 2000) on power. Foucault considers power to be available 
everywhere, existing in every societal relationship. Actors therefore assume 
power not so much through strategies and tactics discussed in the earlier sections, 
but simply by the role they have come to play in societal or in this case, 
organizational relationships. The position of power will change only when there is 
a radical change in the nature of the social structure within which the relationship 
exists, hence changing the nature of the relationship. It will be interesting to note 
at this point that while the origin or location of power might be a topic of debate 
among scholars, the usage of power by actors, i.e. politics, is studied in quite 
similar ways. So Bacharach & Baratz (1962) and Foucault (1980) might disagree 
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on where power comes from, but they both agree on the way actors in position of 
power use both overt and covert power as tools of oppression.  
The absence of individual agency in Foucauldian (1980) perspective on power 
makes it less lucrative for organizational managers as they search for actionable 
strategies to control and use power in various organizational settings. Lukes 
(1974) therefore warns against the emphasis on structural determinism and 
suggests that a balanced approach must be adopted when studying power paying 
attention to all of this three dimensions. Grewal (2008) has come to the rescue of 
such managers by presenting his concept of "network power". It is a multi 
dimensional, relational perspective on power that acknowledges the dimensions of 
power as put forward by Lukes (1974) and the automatic submission to the 
societal structures of power, whether the submission is voluntary, in line with 
Weber's (1958) formal authority or coerced, as theorized by Foucault's (2000) 
social domination. It however assumes that the actors in a social network, 
including an organization, is often able to enjoy a decent amount of social agency, 
however actors become subject to social structures not necessarily because of 
external pressures but by an internal need for socialization. Managers therefore 
can make decisions such as entering into organizational relationships that will 
warrant desirable changes to their organizational units. Examples of such 
decisions include a new manufacturing facility's decision to join trade unions with 
various objectives and values, selections of markets for foreign direct investment 
and so on. Each of these decisions will require the organization to conform to the 
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norms, laws and other social structures of the existing network, but by choosing a 
network that requires changes for which the entrant is already prepared will make 
for a healthier environment inside and outside the organization.  
Table 3 breaks down the above discussion into comparable elements. The first 
column lists the different types of power studied above and groups the literature 
on power in organization theory into Traditional, Resource Dependence, New 
Institutional, Conflict, Behavioral, Structural and Multi-dimensional categories. 
Each category has its key authors and mentions whether it treats power as an 
organizational commodity amassed and controlled by an actor (attribute of actor) 
or if it is inherent in the organizational relationship (attribute of relationship). The 
table also mentions if the category of theories deals with power in an 
organization's external or internal environment and differentiates visible and 
measurable forms of power from invisible forms. Finally, the table identifies the 
area of organization where power as treated by the category in question can be 
observed. These areas can include the organization's structure, its day to day 
operation or the practice of power within the organization by its actors to achieve 
various ends, i.e. organizational politics.  
Category Key 
Authors 
Attribute 
of 
Environment Visibility Observed 
in 
Traditional 
theories 
Dahl 
(1961) 
Actor Internal Visible Structure 
Operation 
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French & 
Raven 
(1959) 
Weber 
(1958) 
Resource 
Dependence 
Theories 
Salancik 
& Pfeffer 
(1977) 
Pfeffer & 
Aldrich 
(1976) 
Actor Internal 
relative to 
external 
Visible Operation 
Politics 
New 
Institutional 
Theories 
DiMaggio 
& Powell 
(1983) 
Actor External Visible Structure 
Conflict 
Theories 
Bacharach 
& Baratz 
(1962) 
Hagberg 
(2003) 
Actor Internal Invisible Operation 
Politics 
Behavioral 
Theories 
Tichy & 
Ulrich 
Actor Internal Visible Operation 
Politics 
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(1984) 
Cialdini 
(2001) 
Denhardt 
& 
Denhardt 
(2006) 
Structural 
Theories 
Foucault 
(1980; 
2000) 
 
Relationship Internal in the 
light of 
External 
Visible 
and 
Invisible 
Structure 
Politics 
Multi 
dimensional 
Theories 
Lukes 
(1974) 
Grewal 
(2008) 
Relationship 
Actor has 
some 
agency 
Internal and 
External 
Visible 
and 
Invisible 
Structure 
Operation 
Politics 
Table 3: Concept of power in organization theory  
 
Power in Public Private Partnerships 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), are organizational networks set up to deliver 
public services efficiently (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2007). Power in PPPs can 
therefore be studied in the light of literature available on the topic of power within 
the area of network governance in public administration, as well as the more 
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recent works that analyze various aspects of management in PPPs directly. Power 
has been a topic that has been given significant importance in network governance 
literature. Agranoff & McGuire (2001) list the issue of power as one of the "big 
questions" in network governance. Brass et al (2004) in their review of literature 
dedicate an entire section to the concept of power in network governance. Most of 
this research has maintained a focus on power as an attribute of the network. 
Several studies therefore equate power of an organization within a network with 
its centrality within the network (Brass, 1984). At the same time, a lot of notable 
contributions to literature consider delivery of public service through 
organizational networks as an inherently effective practice (Agranoff & McGuire, 
2004; Sorensen & Torfing, 2006; Agranoff, 2007; Raab & Kenis, 2009). Even in 
the case of criminal and terrorist organizations, network formation has been 
considered as one of the major reasons that imparts resilience to the "dark" 
operations being undertaken by the network (Raab & Milward, 2003). In the same 
vein, the literature on PPPs favors the formation of these networks strongly in the 
interest of effective public service delivery (Bult-Spiering & Dewulf, 2007; Steijn 
et al, 2011). The effectiveness perceived in theory also reflects in professional 
case studies and as a result, formation of PPPs for public service delivery is 
suggested by policy guidelines prepared by a number of international 
development organizations such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB, 2008), 
the World Bank (World Bank, 2007) and United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID, 2011). 
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Based on the above evidence from the literature and empirical studies, it makes 
sense to work with the assumption that network creation is the phenomenon 
where real value is being added to the operation of a PPP, hence if one is to study 
power, it should be studied using network analysis tools, both qualitative, using 
computerized techniques of social network analysis (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005) 
and quantiative, using the spheres of influence of different organizational units 
with the network in terms of their ability to define  the network's institutional 
values (Provan & Milward, 1991). A recent study by Steijn et al (2011) however 
has shown that while formation of PPPs increases the effectiveness of the 
intended public service, the correlation between PPP formation and increase in 
effectiveness becomes insignificant when organizational management practices 
are taken into account. This suggests that the real value is being added not at the 
structure of the PPP but at its management. Furthering this idea, a considerable 
body of literature now exists dealing with network management and the 
competencies required for effective network management (Thomson & Perry, 
2006; Milward & Provan, 2003; Agranoff, 2007; Goldsmith & Eggers, 2004). 
Thomson & Perry (2006), for example, classify such management competencies 
into five dimensions. Competencies that enable network managers to facilitate 
consensus building among member organizations on the network's objectives fall 
in the governance dimension. Competencies that enable managers from one 
member organization to get involved in the managerial decisions of the other 
organization fall under the administrative dimension. Skills using which managers 
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convince organizations that the network goals are in line with their organizational 
goals are classified under the autonomy dimension. On the other hand, the 
mutuality and trust and reciprocity dimensions include managerial skills to 
develop social capital within the network.  
The competencies mentioned above and other competencies identified by 
Goldsmith & Eggers (2004) and Provan & Kenis (2008) essentially have a similar 
theme, i.e. the ability of organizational actors (network managers) to influence 
other organizational actors by using formal and informal strategies to ensure 
conformity to certain objectives (network/ service goals). This observation hints 
towards the fact that the concept of network management contains considerable, if 
not significant similarities with the concept of organizational power. Lessons 
from network management can, therefore, be combined with the theories on 
organizational power in order to a framework for studying power in public service 
networks, such as PPPs. 
 
Framework for Studying Power in PPPs 
Identification of Active Actors.  
PPPs are formed by bringing together organizations representing different sectors 
around a shared set of organizational goals. A study of how various actors access 
and utilize power will have to begin with identifying the "active" actors whose 
individual objectives can support or hinder the PPPs overall objectives and who 
    90 
will be needing to access and utilize power to further those objectives. From 
Andersen's (2004) definition of PPPs, we know that there are at least two active 
actors in the PPP, i.e. a government agency and a private (nonprofit or for-profit) 
organization. For the purpose of this analysis, we can call them the "government" 
and the "implementing" organizations respectively. Inevitably there must be a 
government organization that took the decision to create the PPP in the first place, 
lets call that the "Policy making" organization. In the above discussion we have 
also observed that a special category of actors, known as network managers exists 
specifically to ensure the smooth operation of the network. The literature on 
organization's institutional environment suggests that "professional organizations" 
such as international associations of accountants, or doctors and the like can 
exercise a certain influence by defining the professional norms of the trade that 
the organization is in (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Finally, a PPP cannot continue 
to exist unless its client, the local "community", values the service being provided 
and is satisfied by its quality. The active actors of for studying power in PPPs are 
shown in Figure 2.    
 
Actors and their Power in PPPs.  
Each actor in a PPP has capabilities that enables it to access more power 
compared to other actors in the partnership. According to Srinivas (2009) the 
implementing organizations are usually brought in to a because it has a better 
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technical/professional capabilities than any other stakeholder to serve the intended 
purpose of the partnership. The implementing organizations in a PPP therefore 
have what French & Raven (1959) will call "expert power" over their government 
sector partners and other private entities such as supply contractors. Since the 
involvement of such organizations is usually favored by strong actors in the PPPs 
external environment such as the UN and international development organizations 
(ADB, 2008; World Bank, 2007), these organizations also gain power from the 
strategic contingency perspective (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977), as they are the best 
equipped to deal with changes in the external environment through their expertise 
as well as their reputation.  
According to Goldsmith & Eggers (2004), the policy making organization should 
also exercise caution when including and assigning responsibilities to non 
governmental network members and should keep control over network level 
decisions. Such a structure will impart powers to the government agency that are 
classified under the third dimension of powers as identified by authors like Lukes 
(1974) and Grewal (2008) as the government agency can set the agendas for 
decision making at the network level and can select the actors that will be 
involved in the decision making processes. The government organization involved 
in the operation of the PPP usually has control over financial resources and thus 
has the ability to shut the PPP down if results are not satisfactory, hence giving 
the government organization "coercive power" as identified by French & Raven 
(1959). 
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Network managers in a PPP usually rely on the coercive power shared with them 
by the government agency in charge. However most theories on network 
management emphasize on skills that will give them access to influence through 
informal channels. Strategies of interpersonal influence (Cialdini, 2001) and the 
resulting "referential" (French & Raven, 1959) capital is the source of their power 
in the network. Finally, the community, if satisfied, has the power to "reward" 
(French & Raven, 1959) the government organization by reelecting the officials 
that championed the formation of the PPP. Figure 2 represents a basic power map 
with reference to the usual active actors in a PPP.  
    93 
 
Figure 2: Organizational Power in Public Private Partnerships 
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Role of Power in Success of PPPs 
Figure 2 presents a simplified framework of power in public private partnerships. 
On a practical level, usually a PPP involves more than one government agencies 
and more than one private parties, not to forget a host of contractors, suppliers, 
consultants as well as the internal political conflicts of the community and various 
organizations involved. Also, other forms of power observed in networks, such as 
power as conceptualized in the methods of Social Network Analysis, power with 
respect to a detailed organizational environment taking into account factors 
identified by Dill (1958) such as competitors, technology and government 
regulations will also impact the organizational power of the active actors. At a 
conceptual level, however, it provides clear insight into the organizational power 
dynamics of a PPP and can be used to guide empirical research to study such 
power dynamics. 
On the topic of PPP success, we recall Steijn et al's (2011) research that puts 
network management as the most significant factor in the success of a PPP. As 
noted earlier, each of the network management competency dimensions identified 
by Thomson & Perry (2006) and others deals with the preparedness of managers 
for decision making situations that involve probable conflicts of interest in the 
absence of a formal authority structure. As with all decision making situations 
among actors with varying interests, the formation and operation of a PPPs are 
also ideal grounds for the practice of organizational politics. The managerial 
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competencies identified by Thomson & Perry (2006) will provide network 
managers with the political clout they need to advance the PPP in the direction of 
its public service goals. However, as observed in the framework developed above, 
those competencies cover only part of the political forces at play within the PPP. 
Unless every active actor is inherently motivated to achieve the PPP goals, the 
only way network managers can ensure success is if the sum total of their power, 
informal influence and the authority they experience by virtue of their position in 
the PPP's structure, combined with the power of their supporters within the PPP 
outweighs the combined power of actors opposing the PPP goals. 
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Chapter 4 
METHODOLOGY 
Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
Research Question 
 
Introduction 
The previous sections discussed the relevance of Public Private Partnerships 
(PPP) in the Network Governance area of Public Administration theory and the 
significance of the concept of organizational power in this area. However, as 
observed in my literature review, there exists a gap in extant literature between 
the discussion on the role of organizational power and empirical studies on this 
role. Similar gaps in literature have been identified in other aspects of 
organizational behavior and theory. Denhardt & Denhardt (2011), for example, 
made a similar observation on the concept of leadership in network governance. 
They found that while leadership was considered an important aspect of network 
governance in several theoretical works, there was an absence of empirically 
applicable frameworks to study network leadership. They contributed to bridging 
this gap by presenting a competency model that outlined characteristics of 
successful network leaders. 
While the above sections focused on identification of the gap in literature with 
respect to power in network governance and its role specifically in PPPs, the 
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remainder of this dissertation will attempt to identify a theory that can explain the 
role of organizational power in the success of public private partnerships. The 
research question, therefore, was stated as follows: 
How does organizational power affect the success of a public service 
Public Private Partnership? 
 
 
The research question, while short in statement, is quite complex and calls to 
attention a number of theoretical, analytical and practical considerations that were 
critical in the nature and design of my study. First, it establishes the nature of the 
study as a descriptive one. It also suggests that the outcome of the study will be in 
the form of a theory or elements of a theory that will explain the role of 
organizational power in the success of public private partnerships. It also makes 
obvious my theoretical starting point that organizational power definitely has to 
do something with the success of a PPP. So the research design was made not to 
measure the amount of power in organizational relationships, but to measure the 
usage of power by organizational actors. In that way it can also be stated that the 
research design attempted to study organizational politics as defined by Pfeffer 
(1994).  
Secondly, the research question helps determine a scope of the study. While the 
concept of "success" in public service can be quite complex and can range from 
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economic efficiency and organizational effectiveness to economic and social 
externalities and capacity building; the same concept can be defined rather clearly 
in a PPP. As mentioned in the network typography earlier, PPPs by their very 
nature are project based. Their success, therefore, is dependent on the 
achievement of project goals as specified by the PPP contract. So while studying 
power, my methodology focused on this tight definition of success in PPPs as 
opposed to other approaches to success in network governance.  
Finally, the research question provided an analytical lens for the variables to be 
compared and contrasted using my research methodology. Since the quest was to 
find not just the role of power in the success of PPPs but the deterministic role of 
power towards such success, it was crucial that power was compared to other 
contenders for PPP success. So throughout the course of the study, the questions 
asked and the patterns analyzed focused on determining characteristics of the 
PPPs, such as design of the partnership contracts, monitoring and evaluation, 
quality and reliability of the intervention being attempted by the PPP and so on, 
that could have contributed to its success (or failure thereof) and comparing those 
characteristics to organizational power in relevant situations.  
 
Theoretical Significance 
The gap in literature that my research attempts to bridge called for the study of 
empirical phenomena that could not be linked directly to any existing theory in 
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network governance or organizational literature. As represented by the theoretical 
framework developed in the previous chapter, existing theories able to provide 
broad based constructs that can guide the study of power in PPPs, however they 
do not provide the insight required to create a testable theoretical model. Noting 
the necessity for linking the theory of public administration to the empirical 
phenomena of power in PPPs as identified in the literature review and the lack of 
existing theory to explain it necessitated the need for an inductive study design.  
Undertaking an inductive study design has several implications on the process and 
outcomes of a research project. The induced theory is often incomplete 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) so the researcher has to focus on developing a 
small number of significant and testable theoretical propositions that help explain 
the phenomena under study. Also, such a study design in social science is more 
suitable for developing descriptive theories rather than prescriptive ones (Perry, 
1998). This study does not assume absolute induction as the case is with grounded 
theory research (Perry, 1998; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989a) 
but will attempt to build upon the theoretical framework developed in the 
previous chapter. Finally, my epistemological approach falls under the realistic 
paradigm as defined by Perry (1998), such that I admit the role of power in PPPs 
as an external observable reality.  
My study design is based mainly on the works of Kathleen Eisenhardt (Ozcan & 
Eisenhardt, 2009; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Eisenhardt, 
1989b) in the field of business management and entrepreneurship. My approach 
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makes use of naturalistic qualitative techniques similar to those known to the 
students of grounded theory, however it distinguishes itself from traditional 
grounded theory because the final product are elements of a positivistic theory as 
opposed to interprative insights into an observed phenomenon which is often the 
case with grounded theory research (Perry, 1998). Additionally, as mentioned 
above, my research does not imply absolute induction as the case is with 
grounded theory, but it begins with a partial deduction of constructs from existing 
theories and uses those to induce theory fro observed phenomena. Finally, given 
my realistic epistemology, the validity of my research depends on my ability to 
establish the elimination of personal bias in my observations, most commonly 
done in such studies through triangulation of findings using multiple methods and 
sources. 
 
Exploratory Research 
 
Theoretical Exploration 
The above section makes several references to the theoretical model developed in 
my literature review. These references are very relevant to this section because 
they helped me define the scope of my empirical study. Defining the scope is 
critical in any empirical research on networks, or for that matter on organizational 
environments, because defining the network’s boundary or defining the boundary 
that separates an organization from its environment is always a big question in 
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such research. My literature review served as the theoretical exploratory research 
for this project. This exploration was immensely helpful as it streamlined the 
actors, interactions and sources and types of power to be studied in the empirical 
study phase. It also helped me draw the line between deductive and inductive 
nature of my study. The deductive nature of my study was to come as close to the 
empirical phenomenon as possible using existing theory in network governments 
and organizational literature. The inductive part was then to bridge the gap 
between the theoretical propositions required to answer my my research question 
and the theoretical propositions that were the result of my deductive theoretical 
findings.  
 
Empirical Exploration 
The empirical exploration of my research dealt with a number of questions. First 
and foremost, I needed to operationalize some of my theoretical constructs. For 
example, I needed to define clearly what ‘success’ meant in the context of public 
service collaborations. I also needed to verify which actors among the ones 
identified in my theoretical framework are empirically relevant. The same 
question needed to be answered for empirical relevance of the types of power and 
the types of interactions identified by my theoretical framework. I also needed to 
look into my sampling pool. While theoretical sampling was going to be my 
approach in the selection of my research methods, some pre-analysis was required 
to understand the nature of my sources of data and my interview respondents.  
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For my exploratory research on the empirical side, I relied mainly on expert 
testimony. I conducted interviews with experts in community conflict resolution, 
seasoned bureaucrats from the US and from Pakistan, as well as academics and 
community leaders, and finally non-profit workers, especially those working in 
the field in community mobilization in rural Pakistan. The following table 
provides a list of my interview respondents for the exploratory research, along 
with the purpose of the interview. For the sake of anonymity the respondents are 
identified by their professional roles rather than their names.  
 
Resource Areas of Exploration 
Bureaucrat (Pakistan) #1 Policy infrastructure in Pakistan 
Bureaucrat (Pakistan) #1 Concept of success in public 
service 
University Professor (Pakistan) Policy infrastructure in Pakistan 
Identification of potential 
informants 
Nonprofit Leader (Pakistan) Power of community in networks 
Nonprofit Manager (US) Power of community in networks 
Community Conflict Resolution Expert Identification of potential 
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(US) informants 
Community Leader (Pakistan) Power of community in networks 
Public Health Expert (Pakistan) Concept of success in public 
service 
Public Health Program Coordinator 
(Pakistan) 
Identification of potential 
informants 
Table 4: List of Exploratory Interview Respondents. 
 
Findings of Exploratory Research 
After my initial round of interviews, all three of my questions were addressed. On 
the matter of success in public-private partnerships I came to realize that in public 
service projects the absence of success is not necessarily failure. So, the question 
could not be framed around the success or failure of public-private partnerships. It 
had to be framed around the achievement of success or the non-achievement of 
success. Public-private partnerships in public service are usually project driven 
and have set timelines and contractually agreed upon goals. If those goals are met 
within the timelines a public-private partnership can be assumed to be successful. 
On the other hand, if for some reason those goals are not met within the budgeted 
amount of time or the budgeted financial resources, the public-private partnership 
is considered less than successful.  
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Since any public service project measures its success not just by the 
accomplishment of the aggregate of all the agreed upon goals but also on the 
effectiveness of the efforts of the project or the organizations involved there are 
chances that even a less than successful public-private partnership may have been 
successful in some of its targeted areas. This finding also made me sensitive to the 
questions regarding success and failure in my semi-structured interviews. It 
became evident that calling a public-private partnership a failure might offend 
most of my respondents; because even the respondents representing less than 
successful organizations would not consider their organizations a failure.  
While the actors and their relationships I identified in the theoretical framework 
of my literature review were vetted by experts outside of Pakistan, the local 
experts had a different view. Given the context of Pakistani public-private 
partnership, especially in the public health sector, it appeared that community 
does not have the reward power that the literature review suggested it has. The 
reason for this problem is the difference between policy making power of the 
community and the local bureaucrats and politicians. The way Pakistan’s 
bureaucratic infrastructure works has little room for the inclusion of entities that 
operate any lower than federal or provincial levels. There is some involvement of 
city level officials, but their role in policy making is negligible.  
So, while in a fully devolved democracy the community will have significant 
reward power that can alter the outcomes of the network, the empirical 
phenomenon that I was about to study did not conform to that aspect of my 
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theoretical framework. I still wanted to keep some focus on community in the 
questions that I was going to ask from my respondents and the documents that I 
was going to analyze. However, after this discovery, community and the role of 
community in the success of public-private partnerships was not one of my 
primary concerns. I was now mainly focused on the government organizations, 
the network administration organization and the implementing non-profit 
organization in the delivery of the public service.  
 
Research Method 
 
Background 
In the past few decades, a number of prominent scholars such as Mintzberg & 
Waters (1982), Brown & Eisenhardt (1997) and Gilbert (2005) have used 
naturalistic qualitative methodologies, i.e. interviews and analysis of existing 
texts, to conduct positivist inductive studies. The following section elaborates my 
methodology further and explains how the data collection and analysis methods 
were employed to answer questions specific to this study. It also discusses the 
legitimacy of such methods based on their appropriateness to the subject matter as 
well as by comparing my research to some well known studies that have 
employed similar methods.  
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Method Selection 
The inductive nature of this study warranted the selection of a research method 
that is best suited for developing elements of theory from observed phenomenon. 
Case study therefore was the main method selected, as it is preferred by a number 
of academics in the field of organization theory in particular and social science in 
general (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 2009) . With a focus on theory building a dual 
case study model was developed where the case studies were to be compared 
using replication logic. The selection of case study as a method can be justified by 
Yin (2009) analysis of situation that warrants selection of different research 
strategies. Since this research question is a ‘how’ question, surveys and archival 
analysis are not suited for this kind of research, as they are better suited for 
answering ‘who’ ‘what’ ‘where’ ‘how many’ and ‘how much’ questions. 
Experiments are not viable since, in the observed phenomenon, I as a researcher 
had no control on the events taking place. I could merely observe and analyze. 
Finally, since I was observing ongoing phenomenon and not the “dead” history of 
the phenomenon, doing a history could not guarantee accuracy or validity.  
Case study was therefore the only method that suited the form of my research 
question, the extent of my control over observed events, and my temporal focus 
on the events. Yin (2009) defines case study as, “An empirical inquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context especially 
when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.” It 
also states that “the case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive 
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situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points 
and as one result relies on multiple sources of evidence with data needing to 
converge in a triangulating fashion and as other results benefits from the prior 
developments of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis 
[Reformatted - bullet points removed]”. In the light of the above discussion my 
research question fits perfectly with Yin’s definition of situations that require a 
case study analysis.  
 
Case Study Design 
My research required the study a phenomenon that needed to be observed in the 
light of its context and the boundaries between context and current observations 
were not quite visible. Similarly, my theoretical framework urged me to study 
multiple variables through multiple vantage points. And finally, instead of being 
purely inductive, the study was to be primarily guided by existing theory.  Since 
the purpose of this study was to develop elements of a theory as suggested by Yin 
(2009) a dual case study could “immeasurably expands the external 
generalizability” of my findings as compared to a single case study. Since my 
focus was specifically on the management practices within both the public-private 
partnerships as opposed to the overall impact of these partnerships in addition to 
their operation, an embedded case study design was favored over a holistic case 
study design when conducting case studies individually.  
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Within the realm of the dual case study, replication logic was preferred over a 
pooled sampling logic. This was done simply because the purpose of the study 
was to compare the findings from one case study to the other as opposed to 
generalize the overall observations from both the case studies. Guidelines 
provided by Yin (2009) were used in this replication logic, where the theoretical 
framework developed in the literature review was used as starting point that led 
into several iterations of data collection and analysis until the case studies were 
enriched to a point where individual case descriptions could be prepared and 
compared to each other. Cross-case comparisons was then used to develop new 
theoretical propositions.  
 
Sample Selection and Unit of Analysis 
While the discussion so far has focused mainly upon the research question and the 
elements of theory governing the study design, it might be a good idea at this 
point to discuss sample selection and units of analysis for my study. As 
recommended by Eisenhardt (1989a), sampling strategy best suited for an 
inductive case study research is of theoretical sampling. That is, you select your 
samples based on their ability to answer theoretical questions that arise as a result 
of your attempts to link observed data to theory.  
For the purpose of my study, I needed to find examples where I could see 
organizational relationships between different members of public-private 
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partnerships in action, could observe the role of power in those relationships, and 
to observe the development of those relationships vis-a-vie power, and finally to 
assess the role of this power in the success of the public-private partnership. I also 
needed an organizational environment where I could find at least two comparable 
public-private partnership projects in order for my replication logic to work. The 
cases that I selected therefore for my study were of two public-private 
partnerships from the Punjab province of Pakistan.  
These organizations were selected because, for one, they were structured closer to 
the contemporary definition of public-private partnership as discussed in my 
literature review, as in they were partnerships formed between the community and 
different organizations within the local and provincial governments of Pakistan as 
opposed to a simple subcontracting agreement between a government agency and 
a private service provider. Secondly, these two projects provided a tremendous 
opportunity to apply replication logic since both of these involved almost the 
same organizational actors, very similar organizational arrangements, the same 
organizational and infrastructural environments, and even then very different 
outcomes. One project, the Chief Ministers Initiative on Primary Health Care 
(CMIPHC), had been a tremendous success in the eyes of the organizations 
involved as well as the governing bodies overseeing and evaluating the project. 
The other project on Reproductive Health, on the other hand was considered 
problematic if not failed.  
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Both the projects had as implementing partner a large non-profit organization 
called the Punjab Rural Support Program (PRSP) partnered with city and 
provincial governments of Pakistan, the local communities in rural areas of the 
Punjab province, as well as the private sector providers of medicine and 
equipment. For the remainder of this dissertation, I refer to these two projects as 
the Basic Health Project (BHP) and the Reproductive Health Project (RHP) 
respectively. The network administration organization for both projects was the 
Project Support Unit (PSU), that coordinated the network managers also known as 
the District Support Managers (DSMs). The PSU also housed a Project 
Coordinator for the RHP. 
Finally, being situated in a culture where I grew up, these organizations were 
better suited for interpretation of cultural symbols and other informal elements 
during my data collection and analysis. As an added benefit, all the actors 
involved were fluent in English, so translation or language barriers were not an 
issue in generalization of findings or interpretation of common themes.  Also, 
while not relevant from a theory building perspective, the operational areas of 
these PPPs are of significant importance in Pakistan, a country with a large rural 
population and an often alarming lack of access to health and education facilities 
for the rural population. 
Having an embedded design, the case studies had a complex unit of analysis. My 
focus was mainly on how the organizational goals were developed for the PPP 
project and what steps were being taken by different actors to achieve those goals. 
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In essence, I was attempting to identify actors that were being able to govern the 
formation of the PPP goals, and to influence the operation of partner 
organizations such that those goals were achieved. The unit of analysis, therefore, 
was the decision. These decisions were to be analyzed at two different scopes as I 
defined within my theoretical framework: i .e. the formation of the public-private 
partnership and the operation, the variables to be studied from each decision or 
the actors involved, and the direction of power and the final decision.  
While Yin (2009) admits an inability of existing literature to provide universally 
acceptable strategies for linking data to theory, I felt that using theoretical 
sampling and guiding my data analysis by my theoretical framework developed 
the literature review will allow me to make that connection without causing much 
controversy. The replication logic discussed above was of course my intended 
strategy to interpret the findings of my study.  
 
Validity and Reliability Measures 
The identification of unit and variables of analysis also address the construct 
validity of the study. Since the research question attempts to link organizational 
power to the outcomes of a public-private partnership, and since the outcome of a 
PPP is determined by the organizational decisions taken by its actors at a network 
level, and since organizational power is a function of organizational decision 
making (Hatch, 1997), a study of power in the context of organizational decision 
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making, is the most direct way to understand the role of power in the success of 
the organizational network or the PPP. As discussed in the beginning of this 
chapter, the ontological approach of my study is realist. Therefore collection of 
data from multiple sources also supported the construct validity of the study. It 
minimized my observer’s bias through triangulation of observations from multiple 
sources, hence enhancing the external validity of the findings.  
As discussed by Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007), the theory developed through 
inductive research is often incomplete so this study alone may not be able to 
ensure universal generalizability of the theoretical propositions developed. The 
replication logic, however, ensured the maximum possible generalizability 
achievable in such projects, this approach has been supported by a number of well 
received inductive case studies including Eisenhardt (1989b), Brown & 
Eisenhardt (1997) and Chandler (2005).The concurrence of findings of this 
research with existing theory also contributes to the external validity of the 
findings. Finally, for the purpose of reliability, the case study protocol that this 
methodology manifests and a case study database was developed in accordance 
with Yin's (2009) guidelines. 
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Data Collection 
 
Evidence for the study was collected mainly through three sources; organizational 
documents, semi-structured interviews with different actors involved with the 
PPP, unstructured interviewed with PPP employees as well as external experts.  
 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
A total of five semi-structured interviews were conducted with key officials 
involved in either one or both of the projects. These included a former 
organizational leader from PRSP, a middle management representative from 
PRSP, a project coordinator from BHP, a top management official from Packard 
Foundation, the chief collaborator for RHP and a senior official from the Punjab 
government. Each of these interviews lasted from 50 to 75 minutes and all these 
interviews were recorded and were transcribed within 24 hours of recording. 
Table 5 provides a participant overview for semi structured interviews. Appendix 
A consists of the interview guide. 
 
Resource Organizational Affiliation 
Top Level Manager Donor Organization (RHP) 
Former Top Level Manager Implementing Organization 
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Mid Level Manager PSU (Both Projects) 
Network Manager PSU (Both Projects) 
Senior Official Provincial Government 
Table 5: List of Semi-Structured Interview Respondents. 
 
Unstructured Interviews 
A total of 10 unstructured interviews were conducted. These interviews had 
varying lengths and were directed towards confirming or verifying information 
provided in the semi-structured interviews as well as to identify avenues for 
collection of documents. Unstructured interviews were also conducted in cases 
where an understanding needed to be developed of the situation on the ground as 
opposed to what was being observed in documents and semi-structured 
interviews. For example, a member of one of Pakistan’s most active reproductive 
health non-profits was interviewed to determine whether or not a reproductive 
health project in a rural area of the Punjab province caused any conflict with the 
religious elements in the area, as the documents provided by the projects and the 
officials interviewed did not address this concern. Similarly, a representative of a 
local professional organization was interviewed when it was discovered that one 
of the projects was involved in a legal battle with that organization. That 
individual was also able to provide me with a copy of the court records pertaining 
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to the legal conflict. Table 6 provides a participant overview for semi structured 
interviews.  
 
Resource Organizational Affiliation 
Mid Level Manager Donor Organization (RHP) 
Mid Level Official District Government 
Professional Organization 
Representative 
National Level Doctor's Association 
Nonprofit Consultant For Donor Organization (RHP) 
Reproductive Health Expert  
Reproductive Health Program 
Coordination Expert 
 
Basic Health Program Coordination 
Expert 
 
Pharmacy Representative  
Local Community Leader  
Religious Expert  
Table 6: List of Unstructured Interview Respondents 
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Document Collection 
In addition to the documents mentioned above i.e. the court documents and 
external reports, my main focus was  the collection of internal reports such as 
organizational memoranda, monitoring and evaluation reports, annual reports, 
minutes of meetings and so on. Documents spanning a few hundred pages were 
collected through different organizational websites and through special 
permission from organizations responsible for creating those in case of internal / 
non-public documents. Documents were sampled based on their ability to answer 
questions posed in the semi-structured interviews so that the information collected 
from interview participants could be corroborated from organizational documents 
and to fill the missing links in parts of the stories untold by the interview 
respondents. 
 
 
Case Study Database 
The case study database was therefore mainly composed of notes taken during the 
interviews and the preliminary analysis of evidence as well as the documents 
collected and the interview transcripts. Guiding the collection of documents 
through interview questions also ensured a proper chain of evidence, which 
according to Yin (2009) is critical in maintaining the reliability of a case study 
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research. The semi-structured interviews were often followed up by emails or 
phone calls to clarify any confusions regarding statements made or information 
provided. Table 7 presents the case study database. 
 
Case Study Database 
Data Type Artifacts Storage 
Semi - Structured Interview Recordings Digital (Destoryed) Semi - 
Structured 
Interviews 
Semi - Structured Interview Transcripts Digital 
Unstructured Interview Recordings Digital (Destroyed) 
Unstructured Interview Transcripts Digital 
Unstructured 
Interviews 
Unstructured Interview Notes Digital 
Annual Reports Digital 
Newsletters Digital 
Minutes of Meetings Digital 
Contracts Photocopied Paper 
Project Proposals Digital 
Documents 
from 
Implementing 
Organization 
Progress Reports Digital 
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Court Cases Photocopied Paper Government 
Documents 
Monitoring and Evaluation Reports Digital 
Table 7: Case study database 
 
Data Analysis 
 
It is common for case study research to intertwine data collection and analysis 
throughout the duration of the research project. However, a major distinction 
between data analysis and collection can be drawn at the point where the research 
database is saturated and the other moves towards creating case descriptions. 
 
Case Descriptions 
It is important to note that while the study design mainly followed Yin (2009) in 
most of its aspects, at the analysis phase I parted ways from Yin’s 
recommendation of creating individual case reports and adopted the strategy 
selected by Eisenhardt (1989a). I began my analysis by writing case descriptions 
which were less formal compared to Yin’s model of case study reports and 
focused more on highlighting the link between theoretical and empirical 
observations made during the literature review and during the data collection as 
opposed to attempting to increase readability for a general audience.  
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The case descriptions were 5-6 thousand words on average and focused on 
transforming the theoretical framework developed in the literature review into an 
empirical set of observations. Therefore, each case description detailed the public 
and private actors involved in the partnership, the organizational interests of these 
actors, conditions under which the partnership was made and a history of the 
partnering process, an overview of the organizational and functional environments 
of the network, a comparison of the relative powers of actors and the sources of 
those powers, and finally an assessment of the success of the public-private 
partnership. Factors contributing to the success or lack of success of each project 
as noted by various interview participants as well as observed in evaluation 
documents were carefully recorded. Creating case descriptions guided by 
theoretical framework was a very helpful approach when it came to analysis 
within and across the case studies.  
 
Within Case Analysis 
Within case analysis as mentioned above, relied heavily on theoretical 
propositions developed in the literature review. This analytical strategy according 
to Yin (2009) is the most preferred in case study analysis. Theory based analysis 
allowed me to focus on the more relevant aspects of the case study and to ignore 
elements that may seem important but are of little theoretical significance. Basing 
the analysis of data on theoretical propositions also enabled me to use rival 
theories in an attempt to explain empirical observations. According to Yin, the 
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more rival theories one can analyze and reject the more confidence you can place 
in the findings of the study. The main rival theory that I used to compare my 
theoretical framework with was one where a network would automatically work 
perfectly based on the wisdom with which it was structured and the contractual 
obligations that define the relationships in the public-private partnership. Hence, 
for all the decisions that were being taken in the organization and across the 
relationship among organizations, the question I kept asking was, whether the 
network actor was acting towards the pursuit of network goals based on its 
contractual obligations voluntarily, or if it was acting in compliance with the will 
of other organizational actors. Similarly, situations in which the network goals 
were not being pursued actively by partner organizations, I would ask the 
question whether the lack of action was caused due to the flaws in contractual 
structure of the project or by the inability of powerful actors to steer those 
elements towards network goals. 
Basing the within case analysis on theoretical propositions also helped immensely 
in cross case analysis. This was because, due to the qualitative nature of data, it 
was hard to create narratives that could be incorporated into pattern matching 
techniques used by Yin. Theoretical propositions therefore could guide an 
approximation of a pattern on which different narratives could be compared to 
one another.  
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Cross Case Analysis 
The cross case analysis as mentioned by Yin (2009) and Eisenhardt (1989a) was 
an iterative process. I began with the within case analysis and compared my 
analysis to the theoretical framework. I would refine the theoretical framework 
and redo the within case analysis, in the light of the refined framework. 
Eventually I compared my findings from the two cases with each other and used 
the comparison of findings to extend my final theoretical propositions. These 
findings are detailed in the next chapter. This phase of data analysis is the reason 
why Miles & Huberman (1994) considers induction and deduction as inter-related 
processes when it comes to case study analysis. This differs from the Glaser & 
Strauss (1967) approach of absolute induction where empirical data is analyzed to 
develop theoretical hypothesis independent of the existing theoretical 
propositions.  
The iterative nature of such explanation building can often lead to pitfalls such as 
the author’s focus being skewed into an irrelevant direction of data and so on. 
However, as Yin (2009) suggests, this was avoided by paying close attention to 
the case study protocol and maintaining the chain of evidence at all levels of 
analysis. In addition to the validity measures discussed earlier the principles 
outlined by Yin were adopted to ensure the quality of the case study in terms of 
both data collection and analysis.  
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Quality Control for Data Analysis 
In terms of evidence collection, all evidence was collected regardless of its ability 
or inability to deliver outcomes conducive to my theoretical framework. When 
collecting organizational documents, all organizational documents were collected 
that were identified either through the theoretical sampling technique or were 
suggested by interview respondents. Similarly, while conducting semi-structured 
interviews, the respondents were given complete freedom to discuss the role of 
power, the sources of power, and the evaluation of the projects success without 
leading them into a specific narrative. This openness in data collection ensured 
the ability of data to provide a stable base for testing of rival theories.  
While the evidence was collected open mindedly, the collection was not entirely 
without a strategy. Quality was also ensured by keeping the case study protocol 
and the chain of evidence focused on the role of power in the success of public-
private partnerships. According to Yin (2009), such a focus improves the quality 
of a case study by keeping the analysis close to the topic of study, because once 
the evidence becomes part of the case study database all of it has to be used. If the 
evidence collected does not focus on the issue being studied, using it will only 
confuse the researcher and the reader, and will diminish the quality of the study.  
Finally, my own experiences in the research setting, i.e. the rural health sector in 
Pakistan, my familiarity with the culture of rural Punjab, and my familiarity with 
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the operation of the bureaucratic structure in Pakistan based on my previous 
research projects, enabled me to have a better understanding of the management 
discourse in both my case studies, as opposed to other involvements where I could 
have conducted such a case study.  
 
Ethical Considerations 
 
With the advent of institutional review boards in universities, any dissertation 
research nowadays almost guarantees the protection of its human subjects. 
However, in social science research while physical health aspects are not much 
relevant to the safety of human subjects involved, attention is paid to the 
emotional and social risks, upon ones inclusion in a case study research as a key 
informant. For my study these risks mainly included but were not limited to the 
consequences for quality of life such as job security and social standing of the 
respondents. My research took several precautions to mitigate the risk involved 
with the inclusion of my key respondents to the study.  
First of all, all interview data was stored anonymously and was filed according to 
the strategic position of the respondent in my theoretical framework as opposed to 
their physical position in the organizational or network structure. The interview 
recordings were destroyed as soon as transcripts were complete and verified. No 
names were used during the interviews except for well established political or 
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organizational figures. In addition to that, organizational consent was sought from 
all organizations where interviews were conducted or where data was retrieved 
from. The only exception was data freely available on the internet or public 
archives such as the court cases and the annual reports and newsletters of the 
organizations involved.  
Another safety measure was taken by including the top management of both key 
organizations into the interviewing process. That developed a level of comfort 
across the entire network and made it easy for my interview respondents to 
answer my questions freely and candidly. Since the research did not require 
extensive investigative practices, because most if not all data was collected 
through sources that maintained full discloser policies, no respondent was 
observed to be fearful of divulging information that could result in negative 
consequences from the employer or colleagues.  
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Chapter 5 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
Chapter 5: Findings and Analysis 
 
Introduction 
The data analysis started right during the data collection phase. This is quite the 
norm for inductive qualitative research because as Yin (2009) mentions, case 
study analysis is done through collecting data, analyzing the data, and then 
collecting more data to address the questions that arise from the incremental 
analysis. These iterations continue until a level of data saturation is achieved that 
upon final analysis can derive theoretical propositions addressing the research 
question. Since this research design consists of two case studies that follow a 
replication logic, the analysis of data consists of within case analysis as well as 
cross case analysis.  
The main artifacts created after several iterations of initial data collection and 
analysis were two separate narratives done in the tradition of Eisenhardt (1989) 
case histories. These case histories combined everything that was gathered from 
analyzing interviews notes and transcripts and the organizational and public 
domain documents. These case histories, presented as appendices to this 
dissertation, served as the finally saturated case data formed as the result of 
several iterations of data collection and analysis. The remainder of this chapter 
will present the final iteration of data analysis and will present the replication 
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logic outlined in the previous chapter in the light of the theoretical framework that 
was developed after the literature review. Theoretical propositions emerging from 
this replication logic will be presented in the next chapter along with general 
conclusions of this study. The replication logic will be presented over structural, 
functional, and temporal dimensions of the public private partnerships (PPPs) 
represented by the Basic Health Project (BHP) and the Reproductive Health 
Project (RHP).  
 
Explanation of Terms 
The term "organizational group" will be used to describe an organization or a 
group within an organization that forms a node of a governance network. 
The term "project" from this point forward will be used to describe a governance 
network formed by different organizational groups through a Public Private 
Partnership agreement as described in the literature review. Both BHP and RHP 
are therefore governance networks that operate as PPPs. 
The term "collaborator" from this point forward will be used to describe an 
organizational group that is a part of either the BHP or the RHP and is 
considered an active or otherwise significant organizational group within the 
network. 
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Structural Elements 
 
Formation 
The BHP was formed as a result of a project pitch developed by the top 
management of Punjab Rural Support program (PRSP), along with support from 
political leaders of the community. The project was granted by the government of 
the Punjab province and the district governments were brought on board through 
negotiations. The success anticipated from the project was demonstrated in the 
form of a pilot project conducted by PRSP in southern Punjab. A senior civil 
servant with work experience both in the government of Punjab and the BHP 
described the problem and solution approach in the following way: 
"This initiative started in the southern Punjab city of Rahim Yar Khan. 
The basic issue at that time was that the health service delivery was 
inefficient and it was nonexistent in the villages. Its quality was not up to 
the mark, and the real issue was that of the absence of the needed service 
providers, that is the doctors....[S]o what was happening was, that at many 
of these places doctors were absent, but they were taking salaries from the 
government. There was a mutual, I would say, corruption mechanism..... 
the novel model of Public Private Partnership was in this way conceived" 
 
The BHP was mainly staffed by members of the civil service that were either 
seconded from their positions in public service, or were on leave from their public 
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service position. A small number of retired public servants were also hired to staff 
the project. No new financial resources were assigned to the project however 
PRSP was made responsible for the existing financial resources available to the 
Basic Health Units (BHU). The main instrument for the implementation of BHP 
was a service contract between PRSP and the district government brokered by the 
government of Punjab. According to a seasoned ex-civil service member that was 
among the founders of PRSP, the following were the reasons for staffing the 
organization with people from the civil service: 
"[T]here were 3 reasons. Number one is that there was a scarcity of 
qualified human resource, good managers and leaders are not available in 
private sector or in other sectors, that's number one. Number two: even if 
they are available, they lack the experience of how government sector 
works because we have a dominant government- the entire resources come 
from the government, and you know, it needed somebody....who 
understood government structures....and how to become a bridge between 
organizations.....Number three....the lack of trust by the government. 
Because government knew that this way they could pull the strings 
regardless of the organizational arrangements. So this was also one of 
those things." 
 
In the RHP the collaboration came into being by a project pitch from PRSP top 
management to the David and Lucille Packard Foundation's (Packard Foundation) 
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Pakistan chapter. After an initial agreement was arrived on, the government of the 
Punjab as well as the district governments were taken into confidence regarding 
the operation of the new collaboration that was supposed to operate through the 
existing BHUs. The success of the project was expected by the Packard 
Foundation in the form of having a greater outreach in rural Punjab as a result of 
collaborating with government and government-like organizations. According to a 
senior official at the Packard Foundation: 
"[Y]ou know one of the weakest areas as you know in Pakistan has always 
been the services in the rural areas, and the services to the poor, the real 
poor....So instead of, you know, thinking of models, we said why don't we 
partner or work with those organizations that already have community 
outreach" 
" _____  was the leader at that time and was very impressive. So this grant 
was basically given because he provided that kind of leadership at that 
time that we had a lot of confidence that they will make it work....they 
came to us and said we want to work with you" 
The RHP was to rely on the existing staff of PRSP deployed at the BHP which 
was primarily consisted of the aforementioned on-service and retired public 
service. However, some key positions were to be filled by private or non-profit 
sector experts in reproductive health. There was no added government funding for 
the RHP. However the project was allowed the use of capital and human 
resources available at the BHUs. Packard Foundation was responsible for 
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providing the funding for the operational cost of the project, which PRSP 
responsible for the utilization of funds. Table 8 outlines the salient features of the 
formation of both projects. 
 
 Basic Health Project Reproductive Health 
Project 
Decision to 
form PPP 
By government of Punjab to 
improve condition of basic 
health facilities in the province  
By Packard Foundation to 
outreach to rural communities 
in Punjab 
Funding 
party 
- Government of the Punjab 
- District Governments (Physical 
infrastructure) 
- Packard Foundation 
- District Governments 
(Physical infrastructure) 
Key Staff Civil Service Employees 
(Seconded, on leave or retired) 
PRSP Management 
- Civil Service Employees 
(Seconded, on leave or 
retired) 
- Project Coordinator for 
Reproductive Health 
Table 8: Formation of both projects 
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Project Structure 
Since the organizational groups involved in the formation phase of a project might 
not be as involved during its operational phase, this section uses a two level 
approach to identify the project structure. The collaborators in the project 
structure at the formation level are therefore distinguished from the collaborators 
in the operational level. This distinction is maintained in some of the other 
sections in this chapter as well. 
The collaborators for the BHP at the formation level needed the government of 
Punjab in a financial or donor role, PRSP in an expert role and the local 
government organizations in a competitor role. At the operational level, it 
consisted of four major collaborators. These included a project support unit (PSU) 
and its affiliate district support managers in a network management role, the 
government of Punjab in a monitoring and evaluation role, PRSP in an expert role 
and the district governments in a support role. Table 9 Outlines the roles of 
different collaborators in the BHP structure. 
 
Collaborator Role 
Government of Punjab - Donor (Formation level) 
- Support (Operation level) 
- Monitoring and Evaluation (Operation 
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level) 
District Governments - Competitor (Formation level) 
- Support (Operation level) 
PRSP - Expert (Both levels) 
Project Support Unit - Network Management (Operation 
level) 
Table 9: Roles of collaborators in the BHP structure 
 
In the case of the RHP the formation level structure had Packard Foundation in a 
donor role, PRSP in an expert role, and the provincial and district governments in 
a support role. At the operational level the structure consisted of the Packard 
Foundation in a monitoring and evaluation and role, PRSP in an expert role, the 
Project Support Unit and its associated district support managers in a network 
management role, and the local government in a support role. The project 
coordinator hired specifically for RHP, being the only in-house reproductive 
health specialist at PRSP was also expected to help facilitate the communication 
between PRSP, the Packard Foundation and the organizations and individuals 
brought in as external experts. According to the senior management official at 
Packard Foundation: 
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"[T]he only position that was created new was of the Project Coordinator. 
And the project coordinator, we had to hire from the reproductive health 
or family planning job market because they really lacked that capacity" 
Table 10 Outlines the roles of different collaborators in the RHP structure. 
 
Collaborator Role 
Government of Punjab Support (Formation level) 
District Governments Support (Both levels) 
PRSP Expert (Both levels) 
Project Support Unit Network Management (Operation 
level) 
Packard Foundation - Donor (Formation level) 
- Monitoring and Evaluation (Operation 
level) 
Project Coordinator for RHP - Network Management (Formation 
level) 
- Liaison between Managers and 
Reproductive Health Experts 
(Operation level) 
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Table 10: Roles of collaborators in the RHP structure 
 
Funding 
The funding for the management of BHP was coming directly from the 
government of the Punjab. This was done by allotting a single line yearly budget 
item to PRSP for the project. The funding for the operation of BHUs was released 
through district governments upon receiving invoices from PRSP. The budget 
renewal was not tied to any progress indicators. However, it was understood that 
progress indicators played an important role in renewal of the budget. According 
to a network manager for the BHP: 
"what they do is that for the purchase of the medicine and for the payment 
of the salaries of the employees who are working in the the basic health 
units, they transfer the funds to the district government, and then it 
becomes a liability of the district support manager from our side to get in 
touch with the EDO Finance, the person who is basically executive on the 
district government side, and the district coordination officer for the 
release of the funds. On the other side, the provincial government transfers 
the fund to the PSU for salaries for the people who are working here." 
The funding for the RHP was the sole responsibility of the Packard Foundation 
and was provided in tranches agreed upon in the project proposal between PRSP 
and Packard Foundation. According to the project proposal produced by PRSP 
and approved by the Packard Foundation, renewal of funding as well as 
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continuation of project was conditional upon the progress indicator reports that 
PRSP was required to produce on a regular basis. The funding structures of both 
projects are summarized in Table 11. 
 
 Basic Health Project Reproductive Health 
Project 
Operational 
Funds 
Government of the Punjab Packard Foundation 
Buildings and 
Fixed Capital 
District Governments District Governments 
Supplies District Governments Packard Foundation 
Funding Renewal 
Policy 
Discretion of Provincial 
Government 
Based on Progress Indicators 
Table 11: Funding details for both projects 
 
Monitoring Approaches 
As mentioned above, the BHP did not have a monitoring and evaluation system 
built into its contract with the government organizations. However, the 
government of the Punjab had a separate monitoring and evaluation system called 
the Punjab Health Sector Reforms Program (PHSRP). This project constantly 
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evaluates all health facilities owned by the provincial or district governments and 
ranks them using a quantified system of measurement. In addition to that, the 
local government officials were allowed to audit the project run BHUs at any 
time.  
While the BHP was not contractually obliged to keep its BHUs in the top 
positions of these rankings, it was generally understood throughout the project 
that these rankings were important for the continuation of the project. And the 
network managers found it important to maintain a strong presence of BHP run 
BHUs in the top-10 of these rankings. According to a network manager for BHP: 
"[P]er our agreement the designated employees can come and visit and 
check the health  facilities at any time.... there is a third-party....PHSRP: 
Punjab Health Sector Reform Program. This third-party is specifically 
introduced by the provincial government.....they are neither influenced by 
PRSP nor by the district government......there are 8 indicators of the health 
facilities: staff presence, the paramedical staff presence, the doctors' 
presence, the outreach staff presence, the cleanliness of the health facility, 
and the availability of medicine, and so on and so forth. So they have their 
numbers" 
 
In addition to this external monitoring, the BHP had a very strong internal 
monitoring system in the form of Monthly Review Meetings (MRM). Every 
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month, all key officials of PRSP got together with the district support managers 
and review various metrics relevant to the operation and outreach of the BHUs. 
Local partnerships with community and capacity building efforts through inviting 
guest lectures and sharing latest research with medical staff was also an important 
part of the MRM agenda. The MRMs reviewed progress of matters relevant to 
both BHP and RHP. 
The RHP on the other hand was monitored constantly from the inside and the 
outside, through evaluation tools provided in the project proposal and Packard 
Foundation grantee guidelines. A list of objectively verifiable indicators of 
progress was created of the result of a pilot study or a base line study at the 
beginning of the project, and progress is measured in comparison to progress 
made in the previous years. The project also employed the service of external 
evaluators to enhance the credibility of its monitoring and evaluation systems. 
Table 12 presents the monitoring and evaluation approaches for both projects. 
 
 Basic Health Project Reproductive Health 
Project 
Monitoring 
Agency 
- Government of the Punjab 
via PHSRP 
- Internal monitoring by PRSP 
- Packard Foundation 
- Internal monitoring by 
PRSP 
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Evaluation 
Processes 
- PHSRP Audits 
- PRSP Monthly review 
meetings 
- PRSP Self Reporting 
- External Evaluations 
- PRSP Monthly review 
meetings 
Type of Indicators Objective/Quantitative Quantitative and 
Qualitative 
Impact of 
Evaluation 
Reports 
- No Contractual Obligations 
- Perceived as Important for 
Project Continuation 
- Project continuation 
dependent on evaluation 
- Project Goals 
Redesigned According to 
Achieved Progress 
Table 12: Monitoring and evaluation approaches 
 
Network Environment 
 
Collaborator Goal Analysis 
As noted by various writers on network management such as Goldsmith & Eggers 
(2004), different collaborating organizations in a governance network can become 
part of the network to support organizational goals that may or may not coincide 
with the organizational goals. It is therefore important to study the goals of each 
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collaborator organizations in order to understand their ability to contribute 
towards the network and its expected outcomes.  
In the BHP, the government of Punjab joined the network in order to improve the 
performance of health service units in rural areas of the Punjab province. Hence 
the organizational goal of the government of Punjab in the network was to 
achieve a higher level of service delivered at the network run BHUs compared to 
local government run BHUs.  
The goal of PRSP, in turn, was to demonstrate its success in achieving a highly 
efficient model of BHU management. The targeted media of this demonstration 
was the PHSRP ranking and the budget documents that would show that the 
higher operational efficiency was achieved without spending extra public money.  
Like the government of Punjab, the local government also wanted to see an 
increase in the efficiency of the BHUs. However; their goals were different at 
different phases. In the formation phase, the goal of the local government was to 
demonstrate that they could run the BHUs without the intervention of outside 
organizations, hence not allowing BHP to exist in their districts. This was the 
reason why in some districts BHUs run by the government were starting to appear 
in the top rankings of PHSRP. However, once BHP was implemented in a district, 
district governments just provided assistance in terms of financial disbursements 
and maintenance of law and order.  
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At the project support unit, the network managers, based on their training in the 
civil services of Pakistan were experts in the practice of public administration. 
The job description however did not require any experience with the treatment of 
patients or the delivery of direct public health services. Their goal was therefore 
to enhance the organizational efficiency of the BHUs, by making sure that there 
were no difficulties arising from bureaucratic red tapes, law and order problems, 
or other problems such as corruption or employee absenteeism. They were keen 
on ensuring that the BHUs under their control were exceeding all measures of 
efficiency outlined in the PHSRP evaluation processes. All of these measures 
were concerned with the condition and operation of the BHU such as cleanliness, 
availability of medicines, and so on. Table 13 outlines the goals of different 
collaborators in BHP. According to a PRSP employee:  
" All these indicators have their numbers like I can roughly say 60% 
marks goes to the attendance of the paramedics, doctors, and outreach 
staff. The remaining 20% marks goes to medicines, and final 20% marks 
are basically divided into equipment functionality and cleanliness. And the 
PHSRP regularly produce their reports. They produce their reports 
monthly on the 36 districts. There are 36 districts in Punjab and they show 
how the PRSP is working and how the district government is working. 
Like 14 districts are not in PRSP's hands, they are still run by district 
government. So with the grace of Allah Almighty almost 14 of our 
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districts are in the top twenty and we are trying to bring them into the top 
1" 
 
 
Collaborator Goal 
Government of Punjab Improved Efficiency of BHUs 
District Governments Improved Efficiency of BHUs 
PRSP - Improved Positions on PHSRP 
Rankings 
- Project Continuation 
- Project Expansion into more Districts  
Project Support Unit - Improved Positions on PHSRP 
Rankings 
Table 13: Collaborator goals for BHP 
 
In the RHP, the government of Punjab wanted to support the collaboration 
between Packard Foundation and PRSP to promote reproductive health in the 
rural areas of Punjab. The role of the local government was the same as their role 
in the operational phase of the BHP. They were obliged to provide administrative 
and financial support to the BHUs for their basic health operations.  
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The goals of the Packard Foundation were to enhance the condition of 
reproductive health in rural areas of Punjab by training a number of female 
medical support providers called Lady Health Visitors (LHVs), who could 
provide information and support to rural families on the topic of reproductive 
health at a grass root level. Packard Foundation also wanted to build capacity of 
the Basic Health Units to be able to provide basic reproductive health services to 
the populations being served by the BHP. According to a Packard Foundation 
official: 
"[T]his project was for already established BHUs and it was for capacity 
building and then strengthening of providers and setting up systems " 
The goals of PRSP in the RHP were to keep the commitments it made to Packard 
Foundation in the project proposal and by achieving the targeted progress 
indicators that were agreed upon at the beginning of the project. Most of the 
objectively verifiable indicators dealt with the training and deployments of LHVs. 
Other progress indicators dealing with non quantifiable improvement of the 
condition of public health were to be operationalized and delegated to the network 
manager by the resident reproductive specialist hired as a Project Coordinator at 
the project support unit.  
The remaining network managers had goals similar to their goals with the BHP. 
Their focus was hence on economic efficiency and attaining the highest possible 
results with the objectively verifiable indicators such as conducting the training of 
LHV’s in a timely and cost effective manner and making sure that adequate staff 
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was deployed at the BHUs for reproductive health related medical advice and 
treatment. Table 14 outlines the goals of different collaborators in RHP. 
 
Collaborator Goal 
PRSP Project Continuation 
Packard Foundation Increased Progress on Objective and 
Subjective Indicators  
Project Coordinator for RHP Increased Progress on Objective and 
Subjective Indicators 
District Support Managers Increased Progress on Objective 
Indicators 
Table 14: Collaborator goals for RHP 
 
Organizational Power of Collaborators 
This section is an empirical counterpart to the theoretical framework developed in 
the literature review. It analyzes the power of different collaborators observed in 
the network, as opposed to what was expected based on theoretical evidence. The 
similarities or dissimilarities between the two will help develop the theoretical 
propositions expected from the inductive study.  
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In the BHP, the government of Punjab being the founding organization had a lot 
of power. With the ability to terminate the project at any point, it definitely had 
coercive power. Another source of coercive power came from its ability to control 
the funds that would go into the operation of both BHP as well as PRSP itself. 
While PRSP was technically a non profit organization, its sole donor was the 
government of Punjab itself that created PRSP through a provincially mandated 
endowment. In addition to the visible power, the government of Punjab also 
possessed the "invisible" power described in the literature review and written in 
detail by authors like Lukes (1974) and Grewal (2008). This invisible power 
further empowered some collaborators in the network and disempowered others, 
as discussed below. 
PRSP, the key organization in both of the projects, was empowered through its 
expert power. This expertise came from PRSP’s very capable human resource, 
and its ability to takeover the delivery of public services while circumventing the 
hurdles of typical bureaucratic procedures. The organization also drew its power 
from its position in the strategic contingency mechanism of the basic health 
network. It was able to deal with a number of external pressures including 
unlawful interventions from powerful landowners who had enjoyed control over 
the BHUs in the past. It was also able to respond effectively to external pressures 
stemming from isolated political incidents. One distinct example of such a 
strategic contingency is marked by the time when most doctors throughout the 
Punjab province went on strike, leaving the hospitals unstaffed. BHP doctors, 
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under PRSP leadership, not only continued to perform their duties in their BHUs, 
but were even able to serve patients in the government hospitals left untreated as a 
result of the strike. A PRSP employee said of the strike: 
"[T]hat was basically not good for the people, but that was very symbolic 
for PRSP because PRSP has provided its doctor in district hospitals for 
that very time period, like in service hospitals our doctors worked, in 
general hospitals our doctors worked." 
The Project Support Unit and the District Support Managers housed in it, due to 
their backgrounds in the civil service of Pakistan, enjoyed great referential power 
throughout the network. This was because of their well reputed administrative 
training by the civil service of Pakistan as well as the camaraderie shown to them 
by fellow civil servicemen at key positions in various government institutions . 
They also shared PRSP’s ability to deal with strategic contingencies especially 
those relating to PHSRP monitoring and evaluation which were vital for the 
continuation of the project.  
The local government, while having control over financial resources for the 
BHUs, did not enjoy any significant power in the network as their role was 
minimized by the government of Punjab. Similarly, the way the network was 
structured resulted in making the PHSRP evaluation the main reward mechanism 
for the network. This evaluation system had little room for community input. 
Therefore the local community, while being the main beneficiary of the project, 
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did not enjoy any significant power in its operation. Table 15 outlines the types of 
power associated with significant collaborators in BHP.  
 
Collaborator Types of Power 
Government of Punjab - Coercive Power 
- Invisible Power through Ability to 
Design Network Structure 
District Governments Disempowered through Network 
Structure 
PRSP - Expert Power 
- Ability to Respond to Strategic 
Contingency  
Network Managers - Referential Power 
- Ability to Respond to Strategic 
Contingency 
Community Disempowered through Network 
Structure 
Table 15: Power of collaborators in BHP 
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In the RHP, the power structure was slightly different from the BHP. The 
government of Punjab maintained the same role that it had maintained in the 
formation phase of the BHP. However Packard Foundation was collaborating 
with PRSP only in the districts where the BHP had already been implemented. 
Therefore the role of actors involved in the formation phase of the BHP was 
irrelevant in the RHP. Both provincial and district governments maintained a 
supporting role in the RHP and their power in the operation of the project was 
insignificant. 
Packard Foundation had coercive power by being the sole provider of funds to the 
project. It was however very reluctant to use this power due to an organizational 
policy that requires the adoption of grantee empowerment practices as opposed to 
direct influence. PRSP enjoyed expert power originating from its managerial 
capital as discussed earlier. The district support managers in the project support 
unit maintained their referential power and their power to respond to strategic 
contingencies as discussed above.  
The project coordinator for reproductive health held referential power by being 
able to outreach to colleagues within PRSP and having strong reputation in the 
reproductive health sector of Pakistan. In addition to this, by being the only in 
house reproductive health expert in the PRSP top management, the project 
coordinator was a position of considerable power as it responded to the most 
significant strategic contingencies for the network. These strategic contingencies 
arose from the ambiguity the civil service trained network managers felt in the 
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subjective progress indicators identified by Packard Foundation. The RHP 
director was expected to bridge the gap in this understanding, saving the network 
from a possible deadlock. Table 16 outlines the types of power associated with 
significant collaborators in RHP. 
 
Collaborator Types of Power 
Packard Foundation - Coercive Power (Decides not to use) 
- Invisible Power through Ability to 
Design Network Structure 
PRSP - Expert Power 
- Ability to Respond to Strategic 
Contingency  
Project Coordinator for RHP - Expert Power 
- Referential Power 
- Ability to Respond to Strategic 
Contingency  
Network Managers - Referential Power 
- Ability to Respond to Strategic 
Contingency 
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Table 16: Power of collaborators in RHP 
 
Outcomes 
Outcomes for Collaborators 
This section outlines the outcomes of BHP and RHP from the perspectives of 
each of the collaborating organizations. For the sake of brevity, it leaves out the 
organizations that were determined to have no significant power in the operation 
of the network: 
The health infrastructure in the Punjab province was already devolved to district 
governments. However, since the civil servants in charge of managing this 
infrastructure, spanned the boundaries of different levels of government. This 
made the provincial government, especially the Chief Ministers Office, concerned 
with the quality of  public health management at ever level of government. 
Partnering with PRSP and monitoring the project performance through PHSRP, 
helped the provincial government to change its role from direct involvement to 
meta-governance. 
For PRSP, the BHP brought home credibility that enabled it to survive a massive 
political regime change in the provincial government. Such survival is quite 
remarkable in Pakistan where shelving of even beneficial government projects 
upon a political regime change is standard practice. It also enabled the 
organization to expand its sphere of influence to several districts of the Punjab 
province. Its success attracted international organizations such as the World Bank, 
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Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI Alliance), and most 
significantly the Packard Foundation to conduct joint projects with it in the health 
sector. Such success and exposure was unprecedented for PRSP as it previously 
held the reputation of mainly being a microfinance organization.  
The projects support unit for the RHP did not enjoy success or progress 
comparable to its basic health counterpart. The first project coordinator that 
completed the baseline studies quit the project before the implementation phase 
even began. The project coordinator hired with much trouble as a replacement 
was let go due to performance issues as noted by the PRSP top management in the 
progress report. After that, the projects support unit of the BHP attempted to 
resume the responsibilities of the RHP director. But due to the lack of expertise in 
reproductive health, they were unable to bridge the gap between the 
organizational cultures of PRSP and the Packard Foundation. The RHP support 
unit had therefore become defunct after the departure of the second project 
coordinator. A Packard Foundation official described the issues arising from the 
project coordinator position as follows: 
"[P]roject coordinator was kind of the only post that they agreed to endure 
in the budgets as a specific to this project.... they hired a project 
coordinator which was a very experienced doctor and we were happy to 
see her there....but I think she got really really tired of the 
bureaucracy....then they hired somebody....who'd been working in the 
    151 
army, again a very different kind of environment....she got fired, and they 
kept saying, 'we haven't been able to find a good coordinator'" 
 
 Regarding the role of the civil service trained network managers that tried 
to run the RHP after the departure of the last project coordinator, a Packard 
Foundation executive said: 
" [I]f you look at the quantitative indicators, they were able to do it 
completely. So they have trained the providers, they have done a baseline, 
they have completed whatever they were supposed to do, but when we go 
in and look at their providers, we look at things differently. We want to 
see what is the quality of her counseling, how she's been taking that kind 
of direction...and how she's been obtaining and generating the data. They 
don't want to look into these things. So that becomes like a different thing" 
The Packard Foundation had started their participation in the RHP with high 
hopes. However, towards the end of the project, the Packard Foundation had 
become weary of its inability to form a mutual understanding of the project's 
intended outcomes with PRSP. The funds transferred to PRSP in the later stages 
of the projects, ended up being unassigned. Packard Foundation decided not to 
show too much interest in future collaborations with government organizations. 
Table 17 summarizes outcomes for significant collaborators in both projects. 
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Collaborator Outcome 
Government of Punjab Meta-Governance 
PRSP - Increased Influence 
- Increased Resources 
- Increased Outreach 
Packard Foundation Being Wary of Future Collaborations 
with Government Organizations 
Project Coordinator for RHP Collapse of Position 
Table 17: Outcomes for collaborators in both projects 
 
Outcomes for Networks / PPP Success 
As discussed in the previous chapter, success of a public service network is a 
complicated concept. Even with the problem oriented approaches of public 
private partnerships, it is often hard to label a project successful or unsuccessful 
on the basis of a single set of measures. This ambiguity in evaluating PPP success 
was also apparent in participant interviews. 
When asked whether or not their respective project was successful, most 
participants referred to more than one aspects of success, which could be 
classified into three categories. These aspects consisted of the achievement of 
objectively verifiable indicators as well as the satisfaction of the donor agency 
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that was responsible for creating the partnership in the first place. The feelings of 
collaborators from the partnership experience, including collective learning and 
shared values that evolved in the partnership also seemed important to almost all 
respondents. Finally, while describing what they considered success or failure of 
the network, many respondents referred to contributions made by the network 
beyond its intended outcomes. I call such outcomes "externalities" and classify 
them as "positive" or "negative" based on whether the respondents considered 
those beneficial or harmful to the network or the community. 
The BHP was able to achieve its goals in terms objectively verifiable indicators as 
well as. The partnership experience among all members of the BHP, had proved 
to be pleasant. With the exception of a few cases of bureaucratic red tape, PRSP 
enjoyed a cordial relationship with the provincial government as well as the 
district governments. The most significant outcome of these relationships was 
observed in the case stated above where doctors from the BHP helped the 
provincial and district governments continue to provide services when the 
remaining doctors in the province were on strike. The MRMs also provided for a 
regular opportunity to share learning among the network and promote 
opportunities for capacity building. 
The project was also successful in creating a positive externality by encouraging 
the district governments to improve the efficiency of their basic health operations 
(BHU) by creating a healthy competition for the fear of losing basic health units 
to external organizations, several district governments improved their 
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management practices to match the efficiency of network run BHUs. With the 
convergence of all three dimensions of the criteria towards the positive, it can be 
concluded that the BHP was successful in achieving its goals. The donor agency, 
the Government of Punjab, was satisfied with it and showed its satisfaction 
through continued renewals of project funding as well as funding for PRSP. 
In the case of the RHP, there were mixed feelings on the idea of achievement. The 
project had done well in the case of objectively verifiable indicators. However; it 
had not done so well in achieving the relatively subjective progress indicators. In 
terms of stakeholder’s feedback, the PRSP employees considered the project to be 
a success at their end, as they were able to achieve all of the project's goals as 
understood by them. This feeling of success was not shared by the Packard 
Foundation that maintained the mere achievement of economic efficiency was not 
a significant goal of the project. The donor agency was therefore not satisfied with 
the project. When asked if the project was a success, a Packard Foundation 
employee said:  
"[A]ctually that project is not closed because they have our funds, but we 
have not decided what to do with them.....there has been modest success; I 
mean I wouldn't call it highly successful, but yes, definitely I would not 
call it a failure or anything" 
The partnership experience was perhaps the most noticeable area where success 
was not observed in the RHP. Coming from two different sectors, PRSP and the 
Packard Foundation had very different organizational cultures that resulted in 
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very different operational interpretations of the network outcomes even though 
the original spirit was the same. To make matters worse, the position in the 
network, created to bridge this cultural gap could not be effectively staffed. This 
resulted in an overall lack of shared learning from the partnership experience. 
According to a Packard foundation employee: 
"[W]e had had some very high expectations....definitely by design I feel 
that there was a miss from our side; we completely forgot that there are 
like government, they call themselves a kind of a, uh, whatever they call 
themselves, it's not even an NGO, but they gave us that confirmation - that 
they will work like a independent entity...we didn't realize they will be 
unable to really do that " 
The project was however successful in developing collective knowledge in the 
network that resulted in a positive externality. As soon as RHP came to a de facto 
hault, PRSP launched its own reproductive health program offered at the BHUs. 
When asked about that program, a PRSP district support manager responded: 
" Yes, they're part of the reproductive health services directly by PRSP - 
basically within the products of the basic health unit. Like the we have 
deliveries at the basic health unit, maternal healthcare, prenatal/ postnatal 
healthcare, and immunizations, immunization of mother, vaccines." 
On the other hand, the project created a negative externality by making Packard 
Foundation wary of collaborating with public sector organizations. The Packard 
Foundation executive described it as follows: 
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" we are exhausted because, as I told you, this is the project that we 
invested so much of our efforts, but we still have a very large portfolio, we 
have like twenty grantees, and if you evaluated one grantee, it's taking 
away so much of our time....And we really worked hard to make it a 
success....But who could have known: the bureaucracy, the transitions, the 
changes, the slow pace, the very slow spending and you know despite 
several suggestions and technical assistance from our side, we did not see 
the acceleration that we thought we would see." 
 
The above analysis is summarized in Table 18. 
 
 Basic Health Project Reproductive Health 
Project 
Goal Achievement As 
Measured 
High - High (Quantitative 
Goals) 
- Low (Qualitative Goals) 
Goal Achievement As 
Perceived 
High - High (PRSP Employees) 
- Mediocre (Packard 
Foundation Leadership) 
Donor Satisfaction High Low 
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Externalities Positive Both Positive and 
Negative 
Development of Shared 
Learning, Values/ 
Partnership Experience 
- Positive in 
development of shared 
values and learning 
- Pleasant partnership 
experience 
- Positive in development 
of shared values and 
learning 
- Unpleasant partnership 
experience  
Table 18: Factors pointing to success or lack of success 
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Chapter 6 
CONCLUSION 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous chapter presented the findings from the evidence with some degree 
of analysis. However this analysis was focused mainly on organizing the findings 
in a manner that will make it easier to link those to theory. This chapter takes the 
analysis further and attempts to generate theoretical propositions from empirical 
observations.  
As warned by Yin (2009), this is the most uncertain yet extremely important part 
of a case study research. He encourages the researcher to eliminate any alternative 
theoretical explanations of observed phenomenon. According to Eisenhardt & 
Graebner (2007), inductive research done through case studies is often provides 
incomplete theory. At best, it offers a set of theoretical propositions that explain 
parts of the observed phenomenon related to the research question and can be 
tested in future research.  
With this in mind, I focused my final analysis on identifying a small number of 
testable theoretical propositions that offer the best possible answer to my research 
question. Moreover, the analysis was limited to those theoretical propositions that 
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could effectively be challenged by an alternative explanation from theory. The 
analytical strategy involved isolating sub-phenomena pertinent to the research 
question that could be observed in both the case studies. For each pair of sub-
phenomena, at least two theoretical propositions were identified that seemed to 
explain the comparison and contrast between the case studies. Among those, the 
proposition that seemed to better explain the sub-phenomenon and stayed robust 
across the replication logic was chosen as the emerging theoretical proposition.  
In a number of situations presented by the evidence, the emerging theory found 
organizational power as a key factor shaping the turn of events. The alternative 
propositions usually stipulated that the observed changes were due to virtues or 
vices of the network structure. In most cases the analysis did not find the total 
defeat of alternative theory against the emerging theory. The theoretical 
propositions therefore reflected the theoretical position that bore more weight of 
the explanation.  
The remainder of the chapter is dedicated to discussing the contribution of this 
research to theory including avenues for future research. I have also provided my 
comments the key opportunities and limitations faced by this research project. 
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Success of Public Service Public Private Partnership 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, success of public service public private 
partnerships (PPPs) is a complicated concept. Since PPPs are essentially problem 
solving networks, a simple demonstration of their success will be the eradication 
of the targeted problem within the duration of the partnership project. However, 
that is often not the case. Most public service problems are "wicked" problems 
and cannot be completely rooted out no matter how elaborate the PPP design is.  
Success, in the simples of ways, can then be measured by achievement of specific 
milestones set at the beginning of the project and amended during its course. 
While the achievement of milestones marks the success of a public service PPP, 
inability to achieve these does not necessarily point towards its failure. Since the 
PPP is not set up to completely eradicate the problem or completely solve it, the 
milestones are arbitrarily decided by the decision makers based on past 
experiences and speculations about the future. Therefore, when a PPP is not able 
to achieve all of those milestones, it can be due to bad performance by the 
collaborators, but it can also be due to the fact that the milestones were not 
reasonable or comprehensive in the first place.  
A public service PPP might be able to make impact in areas that were not 
captured by the official project goals. These unintended outcomes, that I refer to 
as "externalities" of a PPP, can also point to the success or lack of success of a 
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PPP in serving its public purpose. An interesting example of these complexities 
were observed in the Reproductive Health Project (RHP). The network was 
clearly not able to meet the milestones set for it in the project proposal and 
subsequent progress reports. However, none of the collaborators was willing to 
call it a failure even though both key collaborators showed a lack of interest in 
pursuing it any further. This meant that while the network was not able to achieve 
its intended goals, it definitely had been able to achieve some success that albeit 
unintended was of value to the collaborators. 
Similarly the way a PPP builds capacity of its collaborators through shared values 
and mutual learning, also nurtures a feeling of success by actors within and 
outside the PPP. By building capacity of its collaborators, a PPP can create a 
solution of the targeted problem that can sustain the end of the partnership, again 
showing well recognized success in serving its public purpose. In case of RHP, 
this capacity building was observed in the fact that even though the partnership 
had effectively stopped its operations, Punjab Rural Support Program (PRSP) was 
providing reproductive health services on its own. That way the PPP was able to 
serve its public purpose of providing reproductive healthcare even beyond the life 
of the project. This can be seen both as a positive externality and as an example of 
shared network learning. 
Another complexity in this regard can be summarized as satisfaction of the 
collaborator whose decision was responsible for the creation of the network in the 
first place. In the case of a PPP, this organization is almost always the donor 
    162 
agency. Since the donor agency has control over the life of the project, it will be 
safe to assume that BHP continue to maintain its success as long as the 
Government of Punjab considers it successful. And RHP stopped pursing success 
because the David and Lucille Packard Foundation (Packard Foundation) stopped 
seeing it as viable.  
So an analysis of the evidence identified at least three factors that the success of a 
public service PPP depended upon. These included the PPP's ability to achieve its 
intended outcomes, the collaborators' perception of the success of the success of 
the PPP in serving its public purpose through goal achievement or externalities, 
the shared learning developed within in the network.  
 
Proposition 1 
The success of a public service governance network, implemented as a 
public private partnership is determined by its achievement of its intended 
goals, its ability to create positive externalities, its ability to generate 
positive network values, and its ability to satisfy its donor agency.  
 
This proposition explains why BHP was seen so clearly as a successful project 
and why RHP suffered from a loss of interest by the collaborators, even though 
none of the collaborators was willing to call it an outright unsuccessful project. A 
case can be made that some PPPs will be bound to fail simply because the goals 
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identified by initial decision makers will either be impractical or ineffective in 
serving the public purpose. This objection, while valid, made for a detailed 
discussion on the quality of the PPP's intended outcomes at the point of its 
formation and is touched upon towards the end of this chapter. My study however 
dealt with the PPPs success at the time of its operation. 
 
Power in Public Service Public Private Partnerships 
 
As discussed extensively in Chapter 3, academic discourse on power in networks 
spans several disciplines and several theoretical paradigms. These paradigms, 
when generalized in the broadest possible sense, can be divided into two schools 
of thought. These include the views of power that treat it as a characteristic of an 
actor in a network, and others that treat power as a function of the network 
structure or the social structure on which the network is based.  
It was predicted in chapter three that power in public service PPPs will be 
observed in several different shapes and forms. In some cases, power would be 
encountered as acquired and used by the network actors and in other cases actors 
within the network will appear to be in positions of power based on their location 
within the network structure. In either case, it was expected to observe the use of 
this power to achieve organizational goals. Hence, the use of power to achieve 
goals i.e. organizational power, was expected to be observed regardless of how 
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the actors were able to get access to the power. It was also expected to encounter 
the effects of invisible forms of power, i.e. power that will not be seen as actively 
used in politics by the actors but will limit or enhance the power of different 
actors.  
Upon the analysis of the evidence, all these predictions were found to be true. 
Power was clearly observed as a function of the collaborators. For example, in the 
case of BHP the Government of Punjab had the coercive power to resume or 
terminate the network. This coercive power was accumulated by the government 
of Punjab by its control of the public funds required for the running of the project. 
Another source of coercive power was the formal authority it had over the local 
governments that were responsible for partnering with PRSP. On the other hand, 
PRSP had expert power in both of the projects. The source of this power was 
PRSP's managerial capital, its outreach in rural Punjab and its ability to 
circumvent bureaucratic red tapes prevalent in formal government agencies. The 
district support managers as well as the Project Coordinator for Reproductive 
Health possessed considerable referential power. The source of their power was 
their network management capabilities, reputation of their training, and their 
professional relationships with organizations that formed the immediate 
environment of both networks. 
In RHP, Packard Foundation had coercive power being the sole donor for the 
project. However its internal policies did not allow for any direct intervention into 
the project including any immediate termination of funding. Packard Foundation 
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therefore had power but no political potential. Its coercive power was also 
relatively lesser than the Government of Punjab because the Government Punjab 
was not only the sole donor for BHP but also the sole donor for PRSP itself.  
The role of power as a function of the network structure was also equally clear 
during the analysis of evidence. While the referential power of the district support 
managers was evident, the sources of this power were shared by employees of the 
provincial government, the local government, as well as PRSP. However, what set 
them apart as significantly powerful collaborators was their position in the 
network structure.  
The BHP was operating in an environment that had considerable potential for 
adversity from influential members of the community. These people, usually large 
land owners, that had previously enjoyed unbridled control over the Basic Health 
Unit (BHU) resources. Some of them were even using the BHUs as their cattle 
stables. In order to deal with these intrusions, the BHP had to rely on a number of 
organizations outside the network. And the district support managers were 
responsible for this network boundary spanning. They had to make sure that the 
law and order agencies were providing adequate security to the BHU premises. 
They also had to make sure that the district governments were not withholding 
funds required for the BHU operation based on any personal or organizational 
grudges. So, their position in their network not only empowered the district 
support managers, but also gave them an opportunity to engage in politics to deal 
with strategic contingencies faced by the network from its environment.  
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Similarly in RHP, the project coordinator for reproductive health had expert 
power by being the only reproductive health expert on the PRSP side. The project 
coordinator also had referential power and due to an established reputation in the 
reproductive health sector of Pakistan. However what made this person critically 
powerful in RHP was its position in the network structure. As observed in the 
evidence, the two major collaborators of RHP, Packard Foundation and PRSP, 
suffered from a lack of understanding of each other's organizational culture and 
expectations from each other. This lack of understanding was the source of major 
strategic contingencies for both organizations. The position of the project 
coordinator was the only one that could respond these contingencies by de-
ciphering the communication within the network. So the position in the network 
empowered the incumbent of the project coordinator's seat way beyond the power 
acquired through individual characteristics. 
Finally, while invisible forms of power, by definition, cannot be observed 
directly, their effects can definitely be felt upon an analysis of evidence. For 
example, in the case of BHP my theoretical framework predicted that the 
community served by the BHUs will have some form of reward power within the 
network. However such power was neither observed as a characteristic of the 
community nor it was observed in the position of community within the network.  
This absence of power then can only be explained by what authors like Bacarach 
and Baratz (1962), Grewal (2008), Lukes (1975) refer to as the "invisible power" 
or "agenda setting power". This kind of power, while not visible in the active 
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operation of an organization, allows a powerful actor to give power to or take 
power away from other organizational actors. 
The government of Punjab was able to exercise this invisible power by its control 
over the structure of the BHP. The network had no formal room for the 
community's voice to be heard. This way, the Government of Punjab 
disempowered the local community in BHP. In a similar way, the Government of 
Punjab was able to limit the potential of the district government to intervene in the 
operation of the network. This was done by making a network structure that made 
the district governments in charge of operational funds but with little ability to 
actually terminate the operation of the network. 
 
Proposition 2A 
Power in a public service PPP comes from the individual characteristics of 
the collaborators as well as their position in the network structure.  
 
Proposition 2B 
The donor agency of a public service PPP has the ability to empower or 
disempower collaborators by controlling the network structure at the time 
of its formation. 
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Proposition 2C 
Power in a public service PPP is only effective when the powerful 
collaborator is in a position to engage in organizational politics. i.e. use its 
power to pursue its individual goals regardless of the goals of other 
collaborators. 
 
Power and Success 
 
The analysis till this point developed an understanding of the dynamics of 
organizational power and politics in the formation and operation of public service 
PPPs. A discussion on different aspects of success in PPPs along with the 
measurement and causes of their success or lack thereof was also now complete. 
It was therefore time to address the research question directly. 
Proposition 2B established that the structure of a PPP is one of the key 
determinants of power of its collaborators. However it still needed to be explained 
whether the success of the PPP is dependent entirely on the structure and formal 
management of its various functions, or if power and politics play a role in this 
success. The emerging theory suggested that power plays a very important role in 
making a PPP successful. The rival theory on the other hand suggested that the 
success or lack thereof in a public service PPP can be completely explained by its 
structure and management mechanisms such as monitoring and evaluation. 
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In the case of BHP, the success of the network could be attributed to its structure 
and monitoring and evaluation systems. The PPP followed almost the exact same 
structure as outlined by the pilot project. The intended goals of the project 
remained unchanged through years of operations and the project expanded 
without having to change its model. Evidence shows that BHP was consistently 
successful despite several changes in its top management even though leadership 
by visionary public service veterans of Pakistan, was considered a key factor in 
the establishment and initial success of the project. Similarly it was initially 
assumed that civil service trained officials were critical for network management 
of BHP. However the network stayed effective even when a PRSP employee 
became network manager with no training in the civil service of Pakistan or any 
other public institution.  
All these observations from the evidence may point to the conclusion that the 
success of the network was due to its structure with little room for organizational 
politics. However when the success of BHP is contrasted with the relevant lack of 
success of RHP, it becomes evident that the structure of a network and its 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) mechanisms cannot ensure its success. RHP 
had considerably stronger M&E tools compared to BHP which was being 
evaluated by an organization external to the network, and the network was not 
contractually obligated to uphold a strong performance on those evaluations. 
RHP’s progress indicators on the other hand were built into its project proposal. 
Evaluations of these progress indicators were a key component of the project's 
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consideration for continuation. Similarly, the structure of RHP was almost 
identical to BHP with the added benefit of having a smaller number of 
bureaucratic procedures involved with the disbursement and allocation of funds. 
Despite these structural advantages, RHP was unable to enjoy the success or 
resilience enjoyed by BHP. 
This difference in success can be explained by how power was discovered and 
used in both networks. In the case of BHP, there were a number of powerful 
collaborators in the network. The most powerful of those were the government of 
Punjab, PRSP, and the district support managers. Evidence shows that all of these 
collaborators had goals in complete alignment with the intended outcomes of the 
network. That is, the improvement of the service provided at the BHUs as 
measured by Punjab Health Sector Reform Program (PHSRP). So each of the 
powerful collaborators, while using politics to pursue its own goals, was actually 
pursuing the network’s goals ultimately. This convergence of goals resulted in the 
success across all dimensions identified by Proposition 1.  
The RHP on the other hand had four powerful collaborators, i.e. the Packard 
Foundation, the project coordinator for reproductive health, the district support 
managers, and PRSP. Out of these collaborators, PRSP wanted to add 
reproductive health capabilities to the BHUs so its goals were fairly aligned with 
the network's goals. The district support managers wanted to perform strongly on 
the objectively verifiable progress indicators agreed upon in the project proposal. 
The project coordinator for reproductive health was expected to pursue the 
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subjective yet equally important progress indicators representing the expected 
outcomes of the project. Finally, the Packard Foundation had the organizational 
goals seem as the expected outcomes of the network, i.e. improved progress on 
both objective and subjective goals of the RHP.  
Out of these powerful collaborators, the Packard Foundation, due to its non 
interventionist organizational policies, was not able to exercise politics. The 
project coordinator for reproductive health was a position that got vacated early in 
the life of the project. So even though this position had considerable power, it was 
unable to engage in politics due to human resource issues. The sum total of power 
in the network was therefore represented by the district support managers who 
steered the network in the direction of the objectively verifiable progress 
indicators only. Therefore, due to the imbalance of politics, the project proceeded 
in a direction where it was destined to lack achievement on a whole dimension of 
its intended outcomes. The organizational tensions arising from this imbalance 
resulted in the negative externalities and the lack of shared values and learning 
that are often by-products of a successful network.  
Therefore, while a solid network structure explains the success in one of the 
networks, rule of power and politics proves to provide a robust explanation that 
holds even when their logic is replicated in case of a lack of success. 
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Proposition 3 
A public service PPP tends to pursue goals converged upon by the sum 
total of its politically active collaborators. The PPP is successful if its net 
political direction is towards its intended outcomes. 
  
The Role of Leadership and Personal Influence in PPP Success 
Any implementation of network governance involves not just organizations as  
collaborators but also groups and individuals. It might therefore be important at 
this point to discuss the role of individual influence and leadership in the success 
of public service PPPs. As described in the evidence, both BHP and RHP were 
formed after the leadership of PRSP pitched impressive project proposals to the 
government of Punjab and the Packard Foundation respectively. The theory 
discussed in chapter 3 had predicted that the role of leadership and personal 
influence may play some role in the success of public service PPPs. While 
evidence showed that leadership and personal influence had an important role in 
the formation stages of these networks, these had little to do with the resilience or 
operation of the network. This is evidenced by the fact that neither of the projects 
experienced any major deterioration after the departure of their initial leadership.  
It can therefore be concluded that individual leadership can play an important role 
in designing the structure of a public service PPP, hence manifesting in the power 
described by Proposition 2C. However these were not found to have any direct 
effect on the success of the network. This is perhaps because the self governing 
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nature of the governance network necessitates a form of leadership that is indirect 
in nature. According to Denhardt & Denhardt (2011), network leadership is 
focused more on developing network competencies and values shared by the 
collaborators, as opposed actively steering them. 
  
Donor Control over PPP Success 
 
The term Public Private Partnership has its roots in the theory and practice of 
urban infrastructure development. In that discourse, PPP is often seen as a unique 
outsourcing model in which government and non government actors join forces to 
develop some form of public infrastructure while sharing the risks of 
infrastructural investments. PPPs are seen as project based problem solving 
organizations with very clear goals and time frames, and can be controlled tightly 
by the government agencies that granted the project to private parties. Using the 
same term, in public service delivery would make one assume that the 
government agency, or any donor agency for that matter, would be able to enjoy 
the same level of control. However, the evidence revealed that such was not the 
case. The Packard Foundation, despite having complete financial control on the 
RHP, was not able to steer the network in its intended direction. 
As discussed earlier in this section, the donor agency in a public service PPP has 
the unique ability to design the structure of the project. This allows the donor 
    174 
agency to select the collaborators that will have more powers than the others in 
the network. Another unique ability that the donor agency has in a public service 
PPP is the ability to define the goals of the network. The Packard Foundation in 
RHP provided the project with a set of goals as seemed fit based on its 
organizational goals as well as its assessment of the situation of reproductive 
health in rural Punjab. However, at the time of the formation of the project, it was 
not sure if those goals will be understood by the organizations it was going to 
partner with. It attempted to mitigate that risk by insisting on the appointment of a 
reproductive health specialist by PRSP to oversee the RHP, which did not prove 
to be a sustainable strategy. The reproductive health experts felt alienated in the 
PRSP's government-like environment and kept quitting their jobs, leaving the 
position permanently vacant eventually. 
In the case of BHP on the other hand, where the government of Punjab was the 
chief donor organization, the donor agency was fully aware of the organizational 
cultures of its collaborators. So BHP was given goals that were understood and 
acknowledged not only by the implement collaborator, PRSP, but also by the 
monitoring and evaluation teams of PHSRP. This sharing of goals and vision was 
ensured by the government of Punjab's insistence on staffing PRSP in general and 
BHP in particular by civil service trained officials.  
Packard Foundation was leading a network whose collaborators did not share or 
understand its intended outcomes from the project. Therefore, the only option 
Packard Foundation had was to engage in organizational politics that would steer 
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the network towards the pursuit of its intended outcomes. The chances for its 
success were high given by the considerable coercive power Packard Foundation 
had over the network. However, due to organizational policies and a general lack 
of interest in the later years of the project, Packard Foundation failed to engage in 
these politics. For example, when the position of the project coordinator for 
reproductive health got vacated the lack of understanding between PRSP and 
Packard Foundation became obvious. Packard Foundation at this point could have 
used its coercive power to force PRSP into a hiring a new project coordinator, or 
better still, fill the position directly with someone it trusted. Given the critical 
nature of the job, it would have made sense for the Packard Foundation to insist 
on the creation of a small department consisting of reproductive health experts 
instead of just one position. That way the departure of one employee would not 
have caused a communication breakdown within the network that appears to be 
significant in its lack of success. 
 
Proposition 4 
In order to make sure that a public service PPP follows its intended 
outcomes, a donor organization has to either (a) actively engage in 
politics; (b) select goals that are fully understandable to its powerful 
collaborators, or (c) select collaborators that fully understand its goals. 
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Discussion 
 
Contribution to Literature 
My research started by identifying a plausible theoretical framework, based on an 
extensive literature review on public private partnerships, public administration, 
network governance, organizational theory, and the concept of power and politics. 
The case study method was chosen to collect and analyze the evidence and an 
inductive reasoning approach was employed to link the empirical evidence to 
theory in the form of testable theoretical propositions. However, upon completion, 
every social science research study is faced with the much dreaded, "So What?" 
question. Regardless of how creative the research question was, how skillfully the 
research was conducted, and how valid the research findings are, any research 
study is as good as the contribution it makes to the theoretical literature and its 
discipline.  
I touched upon the theoretical significance of the research question in the 
introduction and methodology chapters of this dissertation. I strongly believe that 
the role of organizational power and politics in the success of a public service 
PPPs is critical to the study of network governance and the study of public 
administration in general. As discussed at several points in this dissertation, the 
concept of power and politics in network governance is considered a major topic 
in the field. Despite a number of questions presented by leading authors in the 
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field on the significance on the study of power and the need to conduct research 
on it, little to no theoretical insight is available in the extant literature on the topic.  
In addition to this, while the organization theory literature presents some high 
quality research on organizations involving private sector networks, not much 
literature is available on multi sector organizational networks. Similarly, while 
both theoretical and practical literature is available on PPPs, most if not all of 
theoretical studies deal with the partnership between government and business 
organizations. The availability of the above mentioned literature might lead one to 
believe that this literature provides us with enough theoretical insight to 
understand power in PPPs involving government and nonprofit organizations. 
This however was not found to be the case upon further investigation. Rufin & 
Rivera-Santos (2012) goes at length to explore differences between business to 
business (B2B) organizational networks as opposed to public private partnerships. 
They conclude that the governance models for PPPs will be very different than 
the B2B governance models.  
This dissertation therefore makes its contribution to two disciplines related to 
Public Administration. For the Organizational Theory literature, it explores the 
power dynamics of organizational networks that involve multi sector 
organizations especially the public and nonprofit sectors. For Network 
Governance, It also attempts to answer the question of power which, according to 
Agranof & Mcguire (2001), is one of the "big" questions in the discipline and 
which to this day remains largely unaddressed, let alone unanswered. 
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Further Research: What was NOT Studied? 
While this research study was successful in generally answering its research 
questions, there are a number of questions on the topic of success of public 
service PPPs and the role of power in the success or lack thereof, that has not 
been addressed. For example, this study has focused primarily on the success of 
the operation of these PPPs, it has not addressed the formation of these PPPs as a 
response to the public service problems addressed by them.  
The study, in its attempt to deal only with politically active collaborators, did not 
collect data from all stakeholders involved in the solution presented by the PPP. 
An analysis of evidence suggested that formation of these PPPs was not accepted 
by all stakeholders critical to these projects. While both of the project case studies 
dealt with health sector projects, no input from health experts was observed in 
formation of either of the projects, neither were doctors or other medical staff 
given any voice in the operation of the project.  
This approach backfired in at least a couple of districts of the Punjab province 
where doctor’s associations sought legal recourse to counter the deployment of 
BHP in their districts. These doctors complained that while their jobs were 
previously guaranteed by the government of Punjab, handing their services over 
to a non government organization, meant that they would not be able to enjoy the 
benefits and job security they use to enjoy in government service. This problem 
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was also non existent in the beginning of the project where the wages paid by 
BHP were considerably higher than the wages paid to regular government 
appointed doctors. However, after a number of reforms in the Public Health 
Sector throughout Pakistan, this salary deferential was considerably low and the 
doctors had less incentive to work for BHP.  
Another factor questioning the formation of these public service PPPs, in their 
current form, arises from the challenges to the quality of solutions provided by 
these initiatives. More often than not, the milestones given to a PPP project in 
public service are conceived by the decision makers based on their own analysis 
of the situation and their problem solving skills. A major disagreement between 
Packard Foundation and PRSP was based on the fact that none of the BHP goals 
dealt with the quality or effectiveness of the services provided at the BHUs. This 
concern also resonated in interviews of ex-PRSP employees that had some 
experience in Pakistan’s health sector. 
A future study exploring the formation of public service PPPs, and the quality and 
effectiveness of their goals will help improve the understanding of success partly 
explained this study. Another avenue for future research can be undertaken by 
increasing the number of cases added to the replication logic. According to almost 
all academic authors that specialize in inductive research involving case study 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Perry, 1998; Yin, 2009), increased number of cases 
considerably enhances generalizability of the findings of a study and strengthens 
the validity of its results.  
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As discussed by Eisenhardt (1989) and revisited by Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007) 
a successful inductive study results in the creation of testable theoretical 
propositions. While discussing avenues for future research, it is important to 
suggest the ways in which these theoretical propositions can be tested upon 
further research.  
These propositions can be tested in the same way in which new cases can be 
added to the research, i.e. deductive studies can be conducted on networks that are 
formed by the same donor organizations in other public policy areas. For 
example, irrigation is a sector where government of Punjab has a long running 
project with the World Bank and local communities. Test cases can also include 
the role of other rural support programs in reproductive health. For example, 
Packard Foundation is has a long history of conducing successful projects with 
the National Rural Support Program of Pakistan. Other deductive studies can be 
conducted in similar settings in other countries where government organizations 
are partnering with non government organizations and international donors to 
form public service PPPs. 
 
Limitations 
The replication logic for this study consists of only two cases. The cases enjoyed 
a high potential for comparison and contrast resulting in a very strong replication. 
However, addition of further cases into the replication logic might bear results 
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different than the study, even though chances of the occurrence is relatively low. 
As with all qualitative research projects, time was another limitation for this 
project as some respondents had to be dropped because of unavailability within 
the few months allocated for data collection for this project. These potential 
respondents were mainly key political figures from Pakistan that had been 
involved in the formation of PRSP and had pioneered the BHP. 
The major limitations of this project however were in the inductive nature of this 
study. As noted by Eisenhardt & Graebner (2007), deductive case study research 
is not capable of providing detailed theory. Its main contribution is in the form of 
theoretical propositions that bridge the gap between the theoretical and the 
empirical to some extent. The theoretical propositions developed here answer the 
research the research question which, as discussed in chapter four, is a critical 
question in the field of network governance. However they still leaves a number 
of related questions from the field unanswered. Future research suggested above 
will help significantly in developing a consolidated understanding of topics 
surrounding but not covered by this study. 
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Interview Guide 
 
Introductory Statement 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. Your experience and 
insights are very important for my research. Before we begin the interview, let us 
go over the informed consent form that outlines your rights and my 
responsibilities with respect to your participation. 
Please let me know whenever you need to take a break and I will stop the recorder 
and we can continue when you are ready. Again, it would be very helpful to us if 
you can offer as much information as possible in answering each question. Do 
you have any questions or concerns before we start? 
 
I - Understanding the Project 
Question 1: Can you briefly describe the history of the Public Private Partnership 
project that you are involved with? 
Probes: 
• Can you elaborate more on how the partnership was formed? 
• Who took the initiative to form the partnership? 
• Which organization was responsible for deciding the goals of the project 
and related timelines? 
• Can you elaborate more on the objectives of the program? 
• Is this program following some documented policies? 
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Question 2: What is the importance of becoming a part of the PPP for your 
organization? 
Probes: 
• What benefits were perceived from forming this particular alliance as 
compared to going with other government or nonprofit organizations? 
• What benefits have been received? 
• Did you have some fears regarding this transition? 
 
II - Operation of the PPP 
Question 3: What is the management structure of the PPP? 
Probes: 
• What are some of the resources and barriers that you have experienced in 
the implementation of your PPP goals? 
• Can you identify leaders or pioneers, whether individuals or groups, who 
have played key roles in making the PPP work? 
• What were the most powerful positions in the partnership, and what in 
your opinion were the sources of their influence? 
• How was your organization maintaining its oversight on the project? 
• What kind of investments did your organization make for the project? 
 
Question 4: What progress has the program made so far? 
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Probes: 
• What are the milestones that have been achieved so far? 
• How did the operations and outcomes of the partnership compare to the 
initial objectives. 
• What were some of the most significant challenges that were faced in 
achieving the objectives? 
• Were there challenges related to the interactions of partner organizations? 
• Were there challenges within the organization of the project (such as 
budgetary or human resource/management/leadership issues) 
• Were the initial goals changed to adapt to the situation on ground in the 
face of the challenges? 
 
III - Impacts 
Question 5: How is the success or failure of the program formally measured? 
Probes: 
• What is the program evaluation process? 
• What kind of progress indicators do you use? 
• What are your impressions about the effectiveness of the program? 
• Would you call the project a success? 
• Would you call the partnership a successful experience? 
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Question 6: Do you feel all stakeholders involved in the PPP benefit from its 
success?  
Probes: 
• Who are the key stakeholders? Are there any major stakeholders that are 
not formally parts of the PPP? 
• Which stakeholders in your opinion benefit most from the success of the 
PPP? 
• Which stakeholders in your opinion have to make compromises to be part 
of the PPP? 
 
Question 8:  Has the PPP developed shared goals and values that hold it together 
beyond the benefits that each participant derives from membership? 
 
This concludes my last question for this interview. Thank you very much for your 
time. Do you have any questions for me? 
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Abbreviation/Acronym/Short Form Full Title/Explanation 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
BHP Basic Health Project (One of the two 
case studies) 
BHU Basic Health Unit 
CMIPHC Chief Minister's Initiative of Primary 
Healthcare 
CSP Civil Service of Pakistan 
DFID Department for International 
Development, United Kingdom 
DMG District Management Group of the 
Civil Service of Pakistan 
DSM District Support Manager 
EDO Executive District Officer 
GAVI Global Alliance for Vaccinations and 
Immunizations 
HMP Her Majesty's Prisons, United 
Kingdom 
LHV Lady Health Visitor 
MRM Monthly Review Meetings 
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NAO Network Administration 
Organization 
NGO Non-governmental Organization 
NPM New Public Management 
NPS New Public Service 
PA Public Administration 
Packard Foundation The David and Lucille Packard 
Foundation 
PFI Public Finance Initiative 
PHSRP Punjab Health Sector Reforms 
Program 
PPMR Public Policy and Management 
Review 
PPP Public Private Partnership 
PRSP Punjab Rural Support Program 
PSU Project Support Unit 
RHP Reproductive Health Project (One of 
the two case studies) 
USAID United States Agency for 
International Development 
USDA United States Department of 
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Agriculture 
  
 
